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INTRODUCTION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)1 was passed
in 1967 in part to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in the employ-
ment context. Section 4(f)(2) of the Act provides an exception to the
ADEA's general prohibitions for differential treatment of older workers
that occurs as part of a "bona fide employee benefit plan."2 In June
1989, the United States Supreme Court issued its first authoritative inter-
pretation of the meaning of the section 4(f)(2) exception, in Public Em-
ployees Retirement System v. Betts.3 The Betts decision sharply reduced
the burden of proof placed on employers under section 4(f)(2) by requir-
ing no showing of a cost justification for any discriminatory treatment
effected under an allegedly bona fide plan. In response, Congress passed
the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA),4 which was
drafted specifically to overturn the Betts decision.5 While the Court's
decision aroused criticism in academic and public policy circles,6 the leg-
islative remedy intended by OWBPA has proven equally controversial.
This Comment discusses and evaluates OWBPA's effectiveness in
overturning Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts7 and reaffirm-
ing the cost-justification rule.' Part I of this Comment analyzes the legis-
1. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(b), 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988), amended by Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990). Procedurally, this subsection may be invoked as an affirmative de-
fense available to employers who are defending age discrimination lawsuits.
3. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
4. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104 Stat. 2287
(1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (West Supp. 1991)). This act was widely known as the "Betts
Bill" before its passage, and will be referred to in this Comment as "OWBPA." See President Signs
Bill Extending Age Bias Protection to Benefit Plans, [Current Developments] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 202, at A3 (Oct. 16, 1990).
5. See OWBPA § 101 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 621, Historical Note (West Supp. 1991)),
which states that "[tihe Congress finds that as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in Public
Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts ... legislative action is necessary to restore the
original congressional intent in passing and amending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
." Id, at § 2 (citation omitted).
6. See, eg., Age Discrimination in Employee Benefit Plans: The Impact of the Betts Decision:
Joint Hearing Before the Select Committee on Aging and the Subcommittee on Employment Opportu-
nities and Labor Management Relations of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Betts Hearing].
7. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
8. This rule, which is sometimes referred to as the "Equal Benefit or Equal Cost" rule, dictates
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lative history of section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA and contrasts it with the
Supreme Court's holding in the Betts decision. Part II analyzes the ma-
jor provisions of Title I of OWBPA, how those provisions change the
ADEA, and how those changes to the ADEA may affect the structure
and range of employee benefits offered to older workers. This Comment
draws the conclusion that, with the exception of OWBPA's clarification
of when employers will be allowed to "integrate" pension-related benefits
with severance pay, OWBPA merely restores the law of employee bene-
fits under the ADEA to its pre-Betts position.
I. THE BETTS DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ADEA
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
The ADEA was passed in 1967 "to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age, to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment, [and] to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employ-
ment."9 The ADEA applies to public and private employers, 10 labor un-
ions, and employment agencies," and it prohibits them from
discriminating against employees over the age of forty in most employ-
ment settings.' 2 As the Supreme Court has recognized, 13 the ADEA is
strikingly similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."4 Indeed,
much of the language of the ADEA was drawn from Title VII.15
that a benefit plan will be legal under the ADEA only if any decrease in the amount of benefits
received by an older employee is due to the increased cost in providing that benefit to older persons.
See infra notes 24-26, 83-89 and accompanying text.
9. Betts, 492 U.S. at 175; Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
10. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). "Employer" is defined as persons engaged in an industry
affecting commerce, having twenty or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(b), (q) (1988). See Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under
the Age Discrimination in Employment AcL" Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REv. 621,
621 (1983).
12. Some exceptions are made to the general application of the ADEA. Tenured faculty at
higher educational institutions, executives and high government policy-makers are given lesser pro-
tection. ADEA Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, §§ 6(a)-(d), 100 Stat. 3342, 3344 (1986)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (1988)). Tenured faculty are protected from mandatory retirement
only until age seventy and this protection will cease in 1994. Id. at § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. 631(b) (1988).
Executives and policy-makers who have amassed at least $44,000 in deferred compensation are pro-
tected from mandatory retirement only until age 65. IdL at § 6(c), 29 U.S.C. 631(c) (1988).
13. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Lorillard v. Pans, 434 U.S. 575,
583-84 (1978).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). See generally Player, supra note 11.
15. In fact, Congress contemplated but decided against including the "aged" as a class to receive
protection under Title VII. Instead, Title VII specifically directed the Secretary of Labor to study
the problem of age discrimination and to recommend legislative remedies. See THE REPORT OF THE
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The ADEA's proscription of discriminatory behavior by employers
is set forth in section 4(a)(1), which states: "It is unlawful to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."' 6
Older workers are given additional protections against invidious segrega-
tion or classification on account of age, 7 age-based expulsion from labor
organizations,'" and retaliatory discharge for revealing employer age-dis-
crimination. 19 Section 7 of the ADEA furnishes the victims of age dis-
crimination with a variety of remedies20 which may be refined or
implemented by regulations promulgated by the Equal Opportunity Em-
ployment Commission ("EEOC").2'
SECRETARY OF LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMI-
NATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965). The first proposed version of the ADEA was the result of the
recommendations made in this report. See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, AGE DIS-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967),
reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213; Player, supra note 11; Niall A. Paul, Reduction in Force Early
Retirement Incentives and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 1989 DET. C.L. REV. 987,
987-93.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1988).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (1988).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988).
20. The equitable remedies of compelled reinstatement or promotion are available to successful
litigants. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). See Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1985)
(reinstatement principles applied to case where employee was demoted twice and denied promo-
tions); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543 (1lth Cir. 1984) (employee
demoted and later denied promotion); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th
Cir. 1983) (reinstatement principles applied to discriminatory hiring decisions); Blim v. Western
Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1984) (employees not repromoted after demotion to nonsupervi-
sory positions as part of reduction in workforce), cert. denied 469 U.S. 874 (1985); DeFrics v.
Harhues, 488 F. Supp. 1037 (C.D. IlM. 1980) (employee denied promotion).
Courts may also award payment of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) (incorporating the rights and provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, as amended). See the "lost wages" or "back wages and benefits" cases: Cancellier v. Feder-
ated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Kelly v.
American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1981); Dean v. American See. Ins. Co., 559
F.2d 1036, 1039 n.9 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d
950, 953 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
In cases of willful violations of the ADEA, liquidated damages may be available. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (1988) (incorporating the "liquidated damages" language of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982)). For a further discussion of ADEA section 7 remedies, see J. Hardin
Marion, Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 45 MD. L.
REv. 298 (1986).
21. The responsibility for enforcing the ADEA was originally given to the Secretary of the
Department of Labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1969). However, enforcement duties were transferred to
the EEOC in 1978. See Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, § 2, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978). This
transfer concentrated the responsibility for enforcement of federal discrimination claims in the
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In addition to the general prohibition of section 4(a)(1), the ADEA
contained a safe harbor provision, section 4(f)(2), which was created to
prevent a chilling effect in the hiring and retention of older employees. 22
Section 4(0(2) read:
It is not unlawful for an employer to observe the terms of... any bona fide
employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan,
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that
no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individ-
ual, and no such... employee benefit plan shall require or permit the invol-
untary retirement of any individual . . . because of the age of such
individual.
23
Two years after the ADEA was adopted, the Department of Labor clari-
fied this safe harbor provision by issuing an Interpretive Bulletin (IB)
which explained the 4(0(2) exception. The IB set forth the cost-justifica-
tion rule, which is sometimes referred to as the "Equal Benefit or Equal
Cost" rule. The rule stated:
A retirement, pension, or insurance plan will be considered in compliance
with the statute where the actual amount of payment made, or cost in-
curred, in behalf of an older worker is equal to that made or incurred in
behalf of a younger worker, even though the older worker may thereby
receive a lesser amount of pension or retirement benefits, or insurance
coverage.
24
Ten years after its original issuance, the Interpretive Bulletin was
amended in response to congressional requests for more comprehensive
guidance regarding section 4(0(2) of the ADEA. 25 The resulting amend-
EEOC, which was created as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to maintain investigatory
mechanisms necessary to pursue the goals of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a)
(1988). For a discussion of regulations relevant to the Betts debate, see infra notes 24-26 and accom-
panying text.
22. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1988), amended by OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103, 104 Stat.
978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(0(2) (West Supp. 1991)). Section 4(0(2) was amended in
1978 to include the "involuntary retirement" language in order to prohibit mandatory retirement.
ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978). The relevance of this amend-
ment to the debate surrounding the cost-justification rule is discussed infra notes 87-89 and accom-
panying text.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1970), 34 Fed. Reg. 9708, 9709 (1969).
25. See 124 CONG. REc. 8219 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted in EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EM-
PLOYMENT ACr 540 (1981) [hereinafter EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] ("The Department of Labor
intends to promulgate comprehensive regulations in order to provide guidance in this regard for
sponsors of employee benefit plans, and the Secretary is urged to act as soon as possible."); Id. at
7881 (remarks of Rep. Hawkins). The Department of Labor responded in order to promote em-
ployer compliance by clarifying the scope and effect of the cost-justification rule in light of the 1978
amendments to the ADEA. See Catherine R. Urban, Section 4(f)(2) of the Age Discrimination in
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ment to the IB stated that:
The legislative history of [§ 4(f)(2)] indicates that its purpose is to permit
age-based reductions in employee benefit plans where such reductions are
justified by significant cost considerations... [w]here employee benefit
plans do meet the criteria in section 4(0(2), benefit levels for older workers
may be reduced to the extent necessary to achieve approximate equivalency
in cost for older and younger workers. A benefit plan will be considered in
compliance with the statute where the actual amount of payment made, or
cost incurred, in behalf of an older worker is equal to that made or incurred
in behalf of a younger worker even though the older worker may thereby
receive a lesser amount of benefits or insurance coverage.
26
Despite the clarity of agencies' interpretations of section 4(0(2), courts
remained uncertain as to: 1) which plans fell within the 4(0(2) exclusion;
and 2) the meaning and purpose of the term "subterfuge" in section
4(0(2). The United States Supreme Court addressed these issues in Pub-
lic Employees Retirement System v. Betts.
B. The Betts Case
In 1985, June Betts, permanently disabled by advancing Alzheimer's
disease, became too ill to perform her duties and retired from her posi-
tion as a speech pathologist with the County of Hamilton, Ohio."' Upon
her retirement, the 61 year old Mrs. Betts was unable to receive disability
benefits because Ohio's Public Employees Retirement System prohibited
persons over sixty from applying for disability benefits.2" Although a
1976 amendment to the Ohio program guaranteed disability beneficiaries
Employment Act: No Justification for Cost Justfication?, 24 IND. L. REv. 161, 176-77 (1991); see
generally Kenneth S. Cohen, Section 4(f)(2) of the Age Discrimination Act: Age Discrimination In
Employee Benefit Plans, 2 W. NEw ENO. L. REV. 379 (1980).
26. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1) (1980), 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1979). After the EEOC assumed
responsibility for the enforcement of the ADEA, see supra note 21, these Department of Labor
regulations were given continued effect by the EEOC's promulgation of regulation 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.10 (1988), 52 Fed. Reg. 23,811, 23,812 (1987).
27. Public Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 163 (1989); see also 136 CoNo. REc. S13240
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum, one of the original co-sponsors of
OWBPA).
28. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 145.35 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp. 1988) states:
Application for disability retirement may be made by a member or by a person acting in
his behalf, or by the member's employer, provided the member has at least five years of
total service credit and has not attained age sixty and is not receiving disability benefits
under any other Ohio State or municipal retirement programs.
For a discussion of Ohio's Public Employees Retirement System, see Betts v. Hamilton County Bd.
of Mental Retardation, 848 F.2d 692, 693 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Public Emp. Ret. Sys. v.
Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
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a minimum of thirty percent of salary,2 9 Mrs. Betts' discrimination claim
arose because there was no corresponding minimum benefits provision
covering ordinary pension benefits for which recipients become eligible at
age sixty.30 As a result of the denial of disability benefits caused by the
lopsided structure of these provisions, Mrs. Betts received only $158.50
per month in age-and-service retirement benefits rather than the $355 per
month a similarly situated fifty-nine year old would have received under
disability retirement.31
The Supreme Court's response to Mrs. Betts' plight was significant
in three respects. First, the majority held that employee benefit plans,
including pensions, did not fall within the language of "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" under section 4(a)(1) of
the ADEA. 2 The Court reasoned that to conclude otherwise would
render section 4(f)(2) "nugatory with respect to post-Act plans."
'33
Second, the Court proceeded to reject the cost-justification interpre-
tation of the term "subterfuge" as it had been applied by the Department
of Labor, the EEOC, and the federal courts of appeals.' The Supreme
Court, following the case of United Air Lines, Ina v. McMann,35 inter-
preted the term "subterfuge" in light of its "plain meaning."' 36 Accord-
ing to the Court, the plain meaning of "subterfuge" was a "scheme"
reflecting a subjective intent to discriminate, and therefore the contempo-
raneous regulations and judicial interpretations of the ADEA were incor-
rect to adopt an objective cost justification requirement.37 The
subterfuge language was read by the Court as providing a narrow prohi-
bition within an otherwise broad exemption for benefit plans under
ADEA.
Third, the Court determined that section 4(1)(2) did not constitute
an affirmative defense for employers accused of distributing employee
29. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 145.36 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp. 1988), discussed in Public Empl.
Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 163 (1989).
30. Betts, 492 U.S. at 163. Under the Ohio program's "vesting" provisions, employees became
eligible to receive their pension benefits when they reached the minimum age of 60. Their payment
was calculated in proportion to the number of years they had been employed within the system. See
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 145.35 (1984) (discussed in Betts, 492 U.S. at 162).
31. Betts, 492 U.S. at 163. Based on this disparity, Mrs. Betts alleged that Ohio's Public Em-
ployees Retirement System was discriminatory on its face. Id. at 164.
32. Id. at 177.
33. Id.
34. See infra Part II.C. of this Comment.
35. 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977).
36. Public Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989).
37. Id. at 171-75.
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benefits38 in a discriminatory fashion. Rather, the Court ruled that "the
employee bears the burden of proving that the discriminatory plan provi-
sion actually was intended to serve the purpose of discriminating in some
non-fringe-benefit aspect of the employment relation." '39
As Congress ascertained at a hearing specifically devoted to analysis
of the Betts decision, the Supreme Court's ruling in Betts had the poten-
tial to wreak havoc with employee benefits programs around the coun-
try.' ° By holding that employee benefits were exempt from the general
protections provided by the ADEA, the Supreme Court opened the door
for employers to spend nearly half of their resources in a discriminatory
fashion.41
38. Generally, fringe benefits in the employment context are noncash benefits to employees
which do not constitute part of ordinary compensation such as wages or salary. See 2 [1981-1991
Transfer Binder] HowARD C. EGLrr, AGE DiSCMiNATION § 16.35 (1990). See, eg., Betts Hear-
ing, supra note 6, at 89, 113-14 (testimony of Mark S. Dichter, attorney, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
Phila., Pa.). In the context of§ 4(0(2) litigation, "fringe" benefits are those types of benefits that are
not sufficiently well integrated with a pension plan to allow that benefit to be offered pursuant to a
"bona fide" pension plan for which the 4(0(2) safe-harbor is available. EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 225 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 491 U.S. 820 (1984), on remand, 651 F. Supp.
1172 (D.NJ. 1987) (summary judgment granted), and aff'd, 930 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1991); Alford v.
City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263, 1272 n.12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982). In Betts, the
Supreme Court listed hiring, firing, wages and salaries as "non-fringe" benefit areas. 492 U.S. at 177.
The effect of OWBPA on the fringe-non-fringe distinction is discussed infra Part II.B. of this
Comment.
39. Betts, 492 U.S. at 181.
40. See Betts Hearing, supra note 6.
41. In the interim between the Betts decision and the passage of OWBPA, it was determined
that "almost 40 percent of the employment dollar is designated for employee benefits." 136 CONG.
REc. S13,600 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Hatch). While this figure demonstrates the
significance of employee benefits in employers' labor cost structure, it does not prove that employers
would exploit the Betts decision's exemption of employee benefits to increase their discriminatory
behavior against older employees. However, the private sector has shown a marked preference for
younger workers in management and supervisory positions. See Economics ofAging: Toward a Full
Share in Abundance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Retirement Income of the
Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). Although economic and "psychologi-
cal" reasons are cited to justify this result, older workers are often more costly to employ because
they often have the greatest longevity with the employer, and are therefore compensated at a higher
wage based either formally or informally on their seniority. See generally JAMES H. SCHULTZ, THE
ECONOMICS OF AGING (2d ed. 1980). Since employers have economic incentives to discriminate
against older workers, OWBPA addresses this type of discrimination directly. Other common forms
of age discrimination against older workers have arisen during the 1980s as the demographics of an
aging baby-boom generation have clashed with dominant corporate ideology and economic realities.
Younger employees, who can often perform similar functions, though with less experience, and
therefore, with some corresponding loss in efficiency, perform the same tasks at a lower wage. Cor-
porations often believed that a staff populated with "old" workers would stigmatize them in their
clients' eyes as less innovative and "go-getting" as firms with a younger face. See 1 EGLIT, supra
note 38, at § 2.21; Paul, supra note 15, at 990 n.14.
The legislative history of the ADEA illustrates Congressional sensitivity to the outdated psycho-
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II. THE OLDER WORKERS BENEFrr PROTECTION ACT (OWBPA)
After Betts, litigants whose claims were still pending42 were faced
with the possibility that the Supreme Court's sudden and unequivocal
rejection of the cost-justification rule meant that employers were now
virtually free to discriminate on the basis of age in the area of non-fringe,
employee benefits.4" The potential impact of the Betts decision was am-
plified by the growing percentage of "older" Americans in our
population.'
logical assumptions which employers have made regarding older employees. See 113 CONG. REC.
31,256 (statement of Sen. Young):
The view that a man or woman is so old at 65 as to warrant compulsory retirement from
industry stems from an era before the turn of the century and comes to us from a period
when life expectancy was about half of the life expectancy of Americans and Europeans
at the present time .... In fact, today they are not as old at 65 [in] thought, action,
physical and mental ability as men and women of Germany and the United States were
at the age of 40 in the 1880's. Yet, for some reason or other, we Americans have ad-
hered to this view of 65 as being the proper age for retirement notwithstanding the fact
that this concept is today as outdated as are flint-lock muskets and candle dips of the
eighteenth century.
See also id. at 31,254 (statement of Sen. Javits) (stating that assumptions about the progressing
uselessness of older employees is a "widespread irrational belief"). The term "ageism" has been
coined to describe the discrimination that results from these attitudes. See, eg., Paul, supra note 15,
at 990. Several organizations have been formed to promote awareness among aging Americans and
the general public of the rights and potential of elder Americans in society, such as the American
Association of Retired Persons, the Gray Panthers, and others. See generally HENRY J. PRATT,
THE GRAY LOBBY (1976).
42. Thirty cases and over four hundred charges were unresolved when Betts was decided. Betts
Hearing, supra note 6, at 222, 227, (letter from Charles Shanor, General Counsel, EEOC, to Rep.
Marge Roukema, ranking minority member of the House Subcomm. on Labor-Management Rela-
tions) (Nov. 6, 1990).
43. Jacquelyn M. Broome, Comment, Public Employees Retirement System v. Bett" Employee
Benefit Plans' Exemption from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 64 TuL. L. REV.
962, 966-67 (1990). As discussed at infra Part II.D. of this Comment, the cost-justification rule had
been the line of demarcation between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory age-related differentials
in benefit provision.
44. In 1987, there were an estimated 51.9 million Americans age 55 or older and 29.8 million
who were at least age 65. Roughly nine percent (22 million) of the total population were between the
ages of 55 and 64. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 101ST CONG., 1sT SESS., INFOR-
MATION PAPER ON AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS 1 (Comm. Print 1989); see also
Mary E. Metz, Comment, Waivers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 59 U. MO.-
KAN. CrrY L. REv. 351, 353-54 (1991).
The ADEA presently covers all employees over the age of 40, except for tenured professors and
high-level "policy-making" employees. See supra note 12. The ADEA originally extended its pro-
tections only to employees between the ages of 40 and 65. The ADEA's prohibitions were extended
to apply to persons aged 69 by the 1978 amendments to the ADEA. See ADEA Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, sec. 12, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978). The ADEA previously had an upper
age limit beyond which mandatory retirement systems would be outside the protection of the
ADEA. However, mandatory retirement was specifically banned by the 1978 Amendment to
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A. The Legislative History of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
The legislative history of OWBPA is tortuous. While the Legisla-
tive response to the Betts ruling was virtually immediate,4" the bill under-
went five revisions in the House and Senate before its passage.46
OWBPA was enacted specifically to redress the perceived damage to age
discrimination law caused by the Betts decision, through four specific
means. First, OWBPA clearly places employee benefits47 within the
§ 4(0(2) of the ADEA which dictated that § 4(0(2) did not protect any benefit plan which "shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual [between the ages of 40 and 69] be-
cause of the age of such individual." See H.R. 5383, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Although both
H.R. 5383 and its Senate counterpart were debated before the Supreme Court spoke on the issue, the
amendment did not become law until after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in United
Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (holding that an involuntary retirement plan initi-
ated before the ADEA was passed in 1967 could not possibly be a "subterfuge" to evade the pur-
poses of the ADEA because defendants could not have designed a plan to circumvent a statute they
had no idea would exist). The importance of the 1978 prohibition of involuntary retirement and
McMann are discussed infra at notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
45. The first "Betts Bill," the original version of S. 1511, was introduced only six weeks after the
Supreme Court announced its decision in Betts. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 50 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1555. The rapidity with which the Congress held its hearings and
drafted the OWBPA led many members to question the wisdom of passing it without further analy-
sis of its effects. See the remarks of Sen. Hatch (R. Utah), who queried:
Have we not learned anything from our recent experiences with catastrophic health care
and section 89? In both cases, we rushed to enact laws we thought the public wanted.
The fact was that we enacted legislation with nice titles and noble purposes, but gave
short shrift to the mechanics of the law's implementation.
136 CONG. Rac. S13,248 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 136 CONo.
REc. S13,297 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (stating that the unforeseen com-
plexity of the issue was illustrated by the fact the Congressional Research Service was commissioned
to engage in ten studies of the effects of the Betts ruling); 136 CONG. REc. H8620 (daily ed. Oct. 2,
1990) (statement of Rep. Goodling) (approving the bill, but reiterating his previous fears that a year
after the bill passed, Congress was "going to have 50, 55, 60, 62-year-old workers descend [sic] upon
Washington, DC [and Congress would be] hoping that the only things they were going to throw...
were tomatoes and eggs. .. ."). But see 136 CONG. REc. S13,604 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (Sen.
Mitchell's statement that "the inconvenience of the need for adjustments is not a reason that can
justify opposition to the legislation. Arbitrary, unfair age discrimination cannot be justified.").
46. 136 CONG. Rac. S13,247-78 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch). OWBPA
was the codification of the fourth version.
47. Employee benefit plans are packages of noncash benefits received in the employment con-
text, the most economically significant of which are employer contributions to pension funds and
employer-provided medical insurance. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Nondiscrimination in Employee
Benefits False Starts and Future Trends, 52 TENN. L. REv. 167, 169 (1985). Employee benefits are
often used in the employment context as substitutes for higher wages, especially in collectively bar-
gained labor contracts. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Joint Hearing before the Senate
Subcomm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Special Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
415 (1989) [hereinafter Act Hearing] (prepared statement of the American Iron and Steel Institute
and the National Association of Manufacturers). The wage for benefit trade-off is particularly sali-
ent in the area of pensions. Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good
Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REv. 419, 454-55 (1984). Benefits which are com-
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prohibitions against age discrimination contained in section 4(a) of the
ADEA.48 Second, OWBPA reaffirms that employers may offer a lesser
amount of benefits only when there is a cost justification for so doing
under a bona fide benefit plan.49 OWBPA also places the burden of proof
on the employer who utilizes section 4(f)(2) as an affirmative defense.5 0
Finally, OWBPA retroactively applies the latest version of the ADEA to
all employee benefit programs outside of federal and state employment
programs.
51
Although the Betts decision itself drew widespread criticism,52 Con-
monly offered in "packages" include group legal service plans, transportation, educational assist-
ance, dependant care assistance and "cafeteria" plans that allow employees to select from a range of
benefits and design their own individual benefit packages. Wiedenbeck, supra, at 170.
48. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1510.
49. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") defines an "employee benefit
plan" to include both pension and welfare plans. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988). An
"employee pension benefit plan" is defined as a plan that provides income deferral or retirement
income. Id. § (3)2, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1988). An "employee welfare benefit plan" includes any
program that provides benefits for contingencies such as illness, accident disability, death, or unem-
ployment. Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). Because OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103(1),
104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1991)) incorporates by
reference EEOC regulation 29 C.F.R. 1625.10, it is clear that OWBPA applies broadly to all fringe
benefits. 29 C.F.R. 1625.10(a)(2)(b) (1991) states: "An 'employee benefit plan' is a plan, such as a
retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which provides employees with what are frequently referred
to as 'fringe benefits."' However, ERISA's definition of "pension plan" is used in OWBPA to en-
sure that valid ERISA pension plans do not run afoul of the ADEA. See OWBPA § 103(3) (codified
at 29 U.S.C.A. § 6230) (West Supp. 1991)) (including the ERISA definition); see also infra Part H.E.
of this Comment. The test of what is a "bona fide" pension plan is the heart of the pre-Betts cost-
justification debate. See infra Part H.C. of this Comment. To the extent courts have focussed on the
definition of a "plan," they have used definitions similar to the definitions used in cases under ER-
ISA: that a plan is defined and pays benefits. See, eg., Patterson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 709,
742 F.2d 456, 466-67 (8th Cir. 1984); Carpenter v. Continental Trailways, 635 F.2d 578, 580 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981); Jensen v. Gulf Oil Ref. & Mktg. Co., 623 F.2d 406,413
(5th Cir. 1980); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 1974); International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1439 v. Union Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 261, 264 (E.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd,
761 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1985); Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 539 F. Supp. 57, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
McKinley v. Bendix Corp., 420 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
If the substantiality of benefits is questioned in the "plan" analysis, that question is to be resolved
by the finder of fact. See Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116, 1124 (3d Cir. 1980); Raymond
v. Bendix Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 49, 50 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
50. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1510.
51. Id. The Hatch-Kassebaum provisions which applied the ADEA to Federal employees were
omitted from OWBPA out of fear that the ripple effect throughout the federal employment system
would disrupt too many federal benefit programs at too great an economic cost. In addition,
OWBPA could not be applied to the federal government without subjecting state government and
private sector employees to the ineffectual protections currently in effect for federal employees. See
infra Part II.E. of this Comment.
52. See Betts Hearing, supra note 6, at 80 (testimony of Karen Clause, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin); id. at 182 (testimony of Ellen Fredel, attorney, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trow-
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gress' early versions of OWBPA were also criticized by labor unions,
employers and commentators who feared that many types of benefit
packages would be jeopardized by Congressional reinstatement of the
cost-justification rule.53 Particular concern was voiced over the fate of
early retirement incentives, such as "window programs," 4 and the abil-
ity to "integrate" pension payments with other types of payments, such
as severance pay and disability payments."5  Critics also debated whether
age-related actuarial data could still be used to provide older workers
"actuarially reduced" health insurance benefits if OWBPA strengthened
and codified the cost-justification rule. 6 The validity of these concerns is
more readily understood in the context of a step-by-step analysis of
bridge, Washington, D.C.); id. at 126 (testimony of Christopher Mackaronis, attorney, Bell, Boyd &
Lloyd, Washington, D.C.); see generally Broome, supra note 43; Paul, supra note 15; Urban, supra
note 25.
53. See infra Part II.E. of this Comment.
54. Early retirement window programs, or "sweetener programs" as they are sometimes called,
involve financial incentives for retirement-eligible employees to accept retirement earlier than they
otherwise would. These incentives are often offered by firms facing the prospect of impending work-
force reductions. See S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1534; 2 EGLIT, supra note 38, § 16.18A. For examples of industry concern, see Betts
Hearing, supra note 6, at 190 (testimony of Fred Rumack, Director of Tax and Legal Services, Buck
Consultants, Inc.); Pending Legislation Seen as Threat to Early Retirement 'Window' Programs, 17
Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1010 (June 11, 1990) (reporting the argument of Kathleen Utgoff,
economist with the Washington D.C. law firm of Groom & Nordberg, that H.R. 3200/S. 1511 hypo-
critically forces employers to forego early retirement incentives which will, in turn, cause them to
impose "extremely expensive and unpalatable workforce reductions."); Neill A. Borowski, Legisla-
tion May Board Shut 'Window'for Early Retirement, CHi. TRIB., July 22, 1990, § 7, at 12B; Mary
Rowland, Your Own Account: Walking Through 'The Window', N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1990, § 3, at
17.
55. Benefit integration is the practice by which the amount of one benefit provided is reduced by
the amount of another benefit received. In the employee benefit context, pension payments are often
"integrated" with Social Security payments. See Betts Hearing, supra note 6, at 190 (testimony of
Fred Rumack). The pre-OWBPA and post-OWBPA status of various types of "integrated" plans is
discussed at infra Part II.E.1. of this Comment. For example, in the Betts case, the Ohio program in
effect integrated the disability payments June Betts was eligible to receive with her stored pension
funds. Another example is that employers, when faced with the threat of plant-closings or
workforce reductions, attempt to integrate the pension payments of retirement-eligible employees
with their severance pay either by reducing their severance check by some proportion of their ac-
crued pension fund or by denying severance pay outright.
56. As is discussed below, the argument was that the cost-justification rule as applied in the
past, and by inference as it would be applied after its mere re-establishment, would jeopardize pres-
ent health insurance and pension programs. See infra Part II.E.I. of this Comment. However, such
concerns were voiced in order to point out the uncertainty of the legislative intent behind S. 1511
and the ambiguity of its drafting. See Act Hearing, supra note 47, at 195, 213 (statement of Fred
Rumack on behalf of the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans (APPWP) (a non-proflt
group whose goal is to foster private pension and employee benefit systems)).
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OWBPA and its effect on the level of protection afforded employee bene-
fit programs.
Mechanically, OWBPA attempts to accomplish its four-part goal57
by: 1) inserting clarifying language into existing provisions of the
ADEA; 8 2) creating specific exceptions and qualifications to the cost-
justification protection of employee benefits; 9 3) specifically addressing
concerns about the scope of the ADEA's protections afforded public em-
ployees and employees bound by collective bargaining agreements;' and
4) by formalizing and protecting the role of voluntary decisionmaking
through a newly added waiver provision.6' Each of these factors coin-
57. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
58. See OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §§ 102, 103, 94 Stat 978, 978-91 (1990) (codified at 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 630(1), 623(0(2) (West Supp. 1991)), discussed infra at Part ll.B. of this Comment.
59. Concerns regarding specific benefit practices are addressed in OWBPA § 103 (codified at 29
U.S.C.A. § 623(k), (1) (West Supp. 1991)), discussed infra at Part H.E. of this Comment.
60. See OWBPA § 105 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623, Historical Note (West Supp.
1991)). Congress' present attitude toward the application of § 4(0(2) to various types of public
employees and to collectively bargained agreements is addressed in OWBPA § 105. OWBPA
§§ 105(b)(l)-(b)(4) provides:
b. Collectively Bargained Agreement. - With respect to any employee benefits pro-
vided in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement -
1. that is in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act;
2. that terminates after such date of enactment;
4. that contain any provision that would be superseded, in whole or part, by this
ide... but for the operation of this Title... shall not apply until the termination of
such collective bargaining agreement or June 1, 1992, whichever occurs first.
As the Minority Senate report indicates, the differential treatment of union and nonunion em-
ployees is a compromise with no rationale other than expedience. See Minority Views on S. 1511 in
S. REP No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1562 (calling the
selective retroactive and prospective application of this bill to nonunion employees, both "unjustifi-
able and unfair."). However, private employers who are not subject to a collective bargaining agree-
ment were given a 180 day grace period as a salve. See 136 CONG. REc. S13,598 (daily ed. Sept. 24,
1990) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). The grace period is granted by OWBPA § 105(a), which
effectuates OWBPA 180 days after its passage. The constitutionality of this retroactively applied
provision aroused some concern on the part of the Justice Department. See iT. at S13,253 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 1990) (letter of Robert Amman to Sen. Metzenbaum).
61. Title II of OWBPA, codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(f) (West Supp. 1991), is designed to
ensure that any waiver of rights under the ADEA for or pursuant to a separation agreement is
knowing and voluntary. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1537. Title II adopts the reasoning of Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 451
(3d Cir. 1988) (adopting a "totality of circumstances" test with reference to the clarity of the release
document, timing of the release, education of the signatory, consideration received, and opportunity
to negotiate in order to ascertain whether the waiver was made "knowingly and voluntarily") and
"disapproves" of the approach of Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539 (8th Cir.)
(applying ordinary contract principles in determining whether release was made knowingly and will-
ingly; waiver rejected only if fraud, deceit, or unconscionable overreaching can be proven), cert,
denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987). As Congress recognizes, Title II of the ADEA is a sharp departure
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bine to create a legislative act which clarifies the protections of the
ADEA without significantly extending those protections.
B. The Inclusion of Employee Benefits in the ADEA
Section 102 of OWBPA62 was specifically enacted to overturn the
first aspect of the Betts holding, thereby placing employee benefits within
the general prohibitions contained in section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA.
6 3
Section 102 amends section 11 of the ADEA64 (the ADEA's definitional
section), by inserting a new subsection (1) which states that the term
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" found in
ADEA section 4(a)(1), "encompasses all employee benefits, including
such benefits provided pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit plan."65
This additional definitional language unequivocally repudiates the
Court's interpretation of section 4(a)(1) and harmonizes section 4(a)(1)
with pre-Betts case-law and interpretations of similar provisions in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196466.
As previously mentioned, the Betts majority held that employee ben-
efits must be seen as unprotected by section 4(a)(1)'s general prohibi-
tions, or section 4(f)(2) would be "nugatory. ' 67  According to Justice
from the stringent protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) § 16(c), and Congress there-
fore intended Title H to be strictly construed to apply only to individuals covered by the ADEA. S.
REp. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1537. The Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) § 16(b) has been interpreted to prohibit waiver through private releases. See,
e-g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 US.. 290, 292, 302 (1985) (FLSA
requirements cannot be waived by employees who work for religious organizations in exchange for
food, clothing, shelter and other benefits); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S.
728, 745 (1981) (employee's rights under FLSA are not barred by a prior submission to arbitration);
D.A. Schulte, Inc., v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114 (1946) (remedy of liquidated damages cannot be
bargained away by settlements); Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 325 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) (prohibi-
tion against waiver of statutory minimum wages, likewise, forbids the waiver of the right to liqui-
dated damages). Because this Comment is only intended to discuss the operation of the cost-
justification rule after OWBPA, an in-depth discussion of the operations of Title II of OWBPA and
the merits of the policy behind that title are beyond the scope of this Comment. However, the stress
on voluntariness in Title H is consistent with OWBPA's position on early retirement incentives. For
a thorough discussion of the legislative history and intent of Title II see SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
AND HuMAN REsouRcEs, THm AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT WAIVER PROTECTION
ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 79, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-17 (1989); see generally Metz, supra note 44,
62. OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 102, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 630W)
(West Supp. 1991)).
63. 136 CONG. REc. H8617 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (explanation of S. 1511 read into the record
at the request of Rep. Clay).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1988).
65. OWBPA § 102 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(1) (West Supp. 1991)).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000(e)(17) (1988). See infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
67. Public Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 177 (1989).
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Kennedy, if section 4(a)(1) were read as including employee benefits, sec-
tion 4(0(2) would allow bona fide benefit plans to discriminate against
older workers in a manner which was "facially irreconcilable with the
prohibitions in § 4(a)(1) and, therefore, with the purposes of the Act
[ADEA] itself."6 The majority concluded that section 4(a)(1) must be
read as not including employee benefits, in order to prevent section
4(0(2) from causing the ADEA to inconsistently permit precisely the
type of discrimination the ADEA meant to prevent.69 Therefore, the
Court concluded, section 4(0(2) applied to employee benefits only
through its use of the term "bona fide benefit plan."'7 Justice Kennedy
stated that section 4(0(2) was specifically designed to exempt employee
benefits from section 4(a)(1) to avoid fighting "the employee [pension]
benefit battle" and thereby give both sections 4(a)(1) and (0(2) their full
meaning.71 Thus the majority applied the long-established principle that
all legislative provisions were enacted to be given effect,7 2 and correctly
characterized Congress' intent to avoid the death of the ADEA over the
pension issue.73
However, the Betts majority's efforts to reconcile these "inimical"
provisions distorted Congress' intent to create a "safe harbor" for pen-
68. Id. As discussed in infra Part H.D. of this Comment, the assertion that the cost-justification
rule allows discrimination within the meaning of that term contained in the ADEA is entirely true.
However, the recognition of the reality of the employment market that employers do not want to pay
more for older workers when they can hire younger replacements has not been seriously questioned
as a rationale for this discrimination.
69. Betts, 492 U.S. at 177.
70. ML
71. Id.
72. HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAWS 434 (2d ed. 1911).
73. On the first day of the 1967 pre-enactment hearings on the ADEA, Sen. Javits criticized the
Johnson administration's bill (S. 830) for its specific reference to retirement plans in the§ 4(0(2) safe
harbor. S. 830's version of § 4(0(2) rendered it not unlawful to "separate involuntarily an employee
under a retirement policy or system where such policy or system is not merely a subterfuge to evade
the purpose of this Act[.]" S. 830, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in Age Discrimination in
Employment" Hearings on &830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on S830]. Sen. Javits
criticized this aspect of the administration bill, remarking that:
The age discrimination law should not be used as the place to fight the pension battle but
that we ought to subordinate the importance of adequate pension benefits for older
workers in favor of the employment of such older workers and not make the equal treat-
ment under pension plans a condition of that employment.
Hearings on S.830, supra, at 27. Sen. Javits' intention was for this battle to be fought and settled by
the enactment of a "comprehensive bill to deal with [the pension] problem," eg., ERISA. 113
CONG. REC. 7076 (1967).
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sions in section 4(f)(2)." 74 Pre-Betts judicial and administrative interpre-
tations clearly demonstrated that section 4(1)(2) operated as such a
provision.75 Section 4(f)(2)'s declaration that "it shall not be unlawful
... " follows the classic form of a "safe harbor" provision.76
Viewing section 4(f)(2) as a proviso, or safe harbor," it is apparent
that the Betts majority was incorrect in its assertion that employee bene-
fits had to be outside the scope of section 4(a)(1) in order for both clauses
to have meaning. Indeed, section 4(f)(2) would be meaningless if the
prohibitions of section 4(a)(1) did not include employee benefits. If em-
ployee benefits were without the protection of section 4(a)(1), there
would be no need to provide a specific provision to exempt them from the
effect of the ADEA because the Act would not apply to employee bene-
fits in the first place.7"
74. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
75. See infira notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
76. The text of § 4(0(2) conforms to the model of a savings clause because it conveys the mean-
ing that the ADEA "shall not hold" bona fide benefit plans to be in violation of the act. See BLAcK,
supra note 72, at 429.
77. Historically, the terms "saving clause, .... safe harbor" and "proviso" have had distinct
meanings. "Saving clauses" are statutory provisions, that "save" existing, vested rights of action
from extinguishment by the operative provisions of a larger act. BLAcK, supra note 72, at 427. The
term "saving clause" was also used to describe "safe harbor" provisions, such as § 4(0(2). "Safe
harbor"/saving clauses exempt a specific thing or class of things out of a list of general objects
covered by an act. Id While § 4(f)(2) conforms to the linguistic model of a "saving clause," its
practical effect also comports with the classic definition of a "proviso"; that is, a clause that adds a
limitation or condition upon the operation of a statute. Id The precise categorization of § 4(0(2) as
a "proviso" or "saving clause" is irrelevant for the purposes of this Comment because the distinc-
tions among these concepts have been blurred by the courts and legislators over time, and these
clauses tend to be interpreted according to the same conventions. See IA NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.22 (4th ed. 1985).
78. While the federal courts have not specifically held that fringe benefits fall within ADEA
§ 4(a)(1), their resort to § 4(0(2) when analyzing the legality of fringe benefit packages presupposes
that fringe benefits are covered by the ADEA. Would it be necessary for an employer to raise
§ 4(0(2) as a defense if an employer could not be liable for the discriminatory fringe benefits pack-
ages in the first place? See eg., Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 848 F.2d 692,
694 (6th Cir. 1988) ("When there is direct evidence that a benefit plan discriminates on the basis of
age, the plan is unlawful unless it falls within the bona fide employee benefit exception of
[§ 4(0(2)]."), rev'd sub nom. Public Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989); EEOC v. City of
Mt. Lebanon, 842 F.2d 1480, 1488 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that although employers may not "dole
out" benefits in a discriminatory manner, "any action in observance of a bona fide employee plan is
exempt from the ADEA's broad scope"); Karlen v. City Colleges, 837 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.)
(citing both § 4(a)(1) and EEOC regulation 29 C.F.R. 1625.10 for the proposition that "where...
the employer uses age - not cost, or years of service, or salary - as the basis for varying retirement
benefits, he had better be able to prove a close correlation between age and cost if he wants to shelter
in the safe harbor of section 4(f)(2)."), cert denied sub nom Cook County College Teachers Union
Local 1600 v. Trustees of Community College, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988); Cipriano v. Board of Educ.,
785 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating in reference to a voluntary early retirement incentive program
1992] OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT 885
In the Betts decision, Justice Kennedy interpreted Senator Javits'
desire to allow employers flexibility in structuring benefits that cost more
to provide to older persons, 9 and a widespread desire on the part of
Congress to avoid the pension battle"° as necessitating a broad, blanket
exception for employee benefits."' However, the Court's view that sec-
tion 4(f)(2) served to provide a complete exemption of employee benefits
is a strained interpretation of the legislative history of the ADEA. Legis-
lative history applying the concept of cost to section 4(f)(2),82 the specific
language of 4(f)(2), and the Supreme Court's interpretation of similar
provisions in Title VII undermine the validity of Justice Kennedy's
analysis.
Section 4(0(2) was Congress' attempt to affirm its commitment to
eradication of arbitrary age discrimination with its recognition of the
economic reality that some benefits cost more to provide to older work-
ers,8 3 and older workers are therefore more expensive to employ than
that "[it is undisputed that, if it were not for § 4(f)(2), the incentive plan would run afoul of
§ 4(a)(1) of the ADEA") (citation omitted); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 225
(3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting an employer's § 4(0(2) defense and stating that "[f]ringe benefit plans unre-
lated to the age cost factor are not included in the 4(0(2) exception"), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 820
(1984), on remand, 651 F. Supp. 1172 (D.NJ. 1987) (summary judgment granted), and aff'd, 930
F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that
the language of § 4(0(2) "suggests that Congress meant to exempt only certain benefit schemes from
the antidiscriminatory provisions of the Act"); Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345-45 (5th Cir.
1977) (interpreting § 4(0(2) as exempting bona fide benefit plans from the ADEA's general prohibi-
tion of age discrimination).
79. Public Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 179 (1989) (quoting Sen. Javits' remarks from
the 1967 debate about § 4(0(2)). See 113 CONG. Rac. 31,254-55 (1967).
80. Betts, 492 U.S. at 177.
81. Al.
82. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
83. For example, pension plans and health insurance benefits may be more expensive to provide
to older workers. Pension plans fall into two categories: defined benefit plans and defined contribu-
tion plans. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34), § 1002(35) (1988); see also Bruce A. Reinhart, Interpret-
ing Section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA: Does Anyone Have a "Plan"?, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1055, 1076
(1987). In a defined benefit plan, an employee's annual retirement income is calculated in proportion
to the employee's salary and years of service. In a defined contribution plan, (such as profit sharing,
savings plans, thrift accounts and IRA's) equal, defined contributions are made per employee with-
out regard to gross salary or longevity. See generally EvEnETT T. ALLEN, JR. ET AL., PENSION
PLANNING: PENSIONS, PROFIT SHARING AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 86-89
(5th ed. 1984). However, an older employee is likely to end his or her employment sooner than a
younger employee and would therefore contribute less toward his or her own pension fund than a
younger worker. Thus, defined benefit plans tend to be more expensive to provide to older employ-
ees because employers must contribute the "equalizing" amount to older workers' defined benefit
accounts. See infra note 122. Historically, most employees who are covered by the private pension
system participate in defined benefit plans. See SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN
AGING: 1985, S. REP. No. 242, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1986) ("[70 percent of] private plan partici-
pants are covered under a defined-benefit pension plan"). However, defined contribution plans are
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younger employees with roughly equivalent skills." During the debates
of the original ADEA, Senator Javits sponsored section 4(0(2) as an
amendment to the Johnson administration's version of the ADEA be-
cause he was concerned that the bill, as proposed, would cause employers
to become "discouraged from hiring older workers because of the in-
creased costs associated with providing benefits to them." 5 As Senator
Javits explained, the Johnson administration proposal did not
provide any flexibility in the amount of pension benefits payable to older
workers depending on their age when hired, and thus may actually en-
courage employers, faced with the necessity of paying greatly increased pre-
miums, to look for excuses not to hire older workers when they might have
hired them under a law granting them a degree of flexibility with respect to
such matters.
86
becoming increasingly important in the workplace. In fact 80% of all new plans established since
ERISA was passed are defined contribution plans. See ALLEN Er AL., supra, at 267 n. 1.
Health insurance benefits are more expensive to provide to older workers based on the actuarial
fact that older persons are more likely to become sick and require ongoing treatment. Tom Johnson,
Understanding the Demographics of Aging, RISK MGT., June 1987, at 78; Metz, supra note 44, at
354. Therefore insurers require higher premiums to provide the same amount of coverage for older
workers. See id at 408; Cohen, supra note 25, at 403-18 (discussing methods by which group insur-
ance plans provided by employers reduce coverage for older employees for group-life and long-term
disability insurance). See generally Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The
Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 835 (1986); C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. &
RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE (1985).
84. Generally, older workers who have achieved high levels of seniority within a company cost
more to employ because of their correspondingly higher level of compensation. See generally
SCHULTZ, supra note 41.
85. S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213;
Hearings on & 830 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1967) [hereinafter Senate ADF Hearing]; see generally Betts
Hearing, supra note 6, at 129, 137-41 (statement of Christopher Mackaronis).
86. Senate ADEA Hearing, supra note 85, at 27. The House sponsors of § 4(0(2) also recog-
nized that the section was "designed to maximize employment possibilities without working an un-
due hardship on employers in providing special and costly benefits." See 113 CoNG. REc. 34,746
(1967) (remarks of Rep. Daniels), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 157.
Congress reaffirmed this understanding of the purpose of§ 4(0(2) during the process of outlawing
mandatory retirement, see infra note 89 and accompanying text, and during hearings held in prepa-
ration for the 1978 amendments to the ADEA. In order to assure skeptics that raising the age cap of
the ADEA to 70 and eliminating mandatory retirement would not raise the cost of providing em-
ployee benefits to older workers, the Report of the Senate Human Resources committee stated:
Concerns were also expressed regarding potential increased costs for employee wel-
fare benefit plans such as disability, health, life and other forms of insurance for employ-
ees. Presently some employers reduce coverage for older workers under these plans or
increase the required employee contribution as workers advance in age. This bill would
not alter existing law with respect to these practices.
S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 508. See generally
Betts Hearing, supra note 6, at 257-65 (supplementary statement of Robert F. Laufman, attorney,
Laufman, Rauh and Gerhardstein, Cincinnati, Ohio).
1992] OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT 887
Clearly, section 4(f)(2) was intended not to require employers to "afford
older workers exactly the same pension, retirement, or insurance benefits
as [they] afford[ ] to younger workers. 8s7 The legislative history of the
1978 amendment to the ADEA that outlawed mandatory retirement"
illustrates Congress' endorsement of the cost-justification approach em-
bodied in the original, and amended, Labor Department Interpretive
Bulletin discussed in Part I.A of this Comment. 9
Section 4(f)(2) contains two operative terms which created confu-
87. 113 CoNG. REC. 31,255 (1967), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25,
at 146. Despite the numerous expressions of legislators' concern that the increased costs of provid-
ing various benefits to older workers would discourage the hiring of older workers, some commenta-
tors viewed the cost-justification rule as a marked departure from the legislative intent of the origin
of § 4(0(2). See Cohen, supra note 25, at 386-88. It is true that "[n]o where in the 1967 history is
the equal cost or equal benefit rule for employee benefit plans articulated." Id. at 387 n.21 (citations
omitted). But see Broome, supra note 43, at 966-69; Paul, supra note 15, at 994-95; Urban, supra
note 25, at 171-73.
88. ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
89. See Betts Hearing, supra note 6, at 260-62 (supplementary statement of Robert F. Laufman).
Without specifically endorsing the Department of Labor regulations, various legislators used lan-
guage that echoes IB 860.120. For example, Representative Waxman stated that
[i]n the absence of actuarial data which clearly demonstrates that the costs of [these
benefits] are uniquely burdensome to the employer, such a policy constitutes discrimina-
tion and a conscious effort to evade the purposes of the act... Exceptions should only
be applied in the strictest sense and only with full justification and cause.
124 CONG. REc. 7888 (1978). Representative Pepper, chairman of the House Select Committee on
Aging, similarly stated:
The exception under section 4(f(2) of the act is just that - an exception - and as such
must be viewed in the narrowest sense.
... The original reason for this exception was to promote the hiring of older persons.
Passage of [the 1978 amendments] should not be construed by any employer, or any
court, to permit the sudden, total and unilateral termination of a capable and healthy
worker from a health, insurance or other welfare benefit plan solely on the basis of age
and withoutfill economic justifcation.
124 CONG. REC. 7886 (1978) (emphasis added). Senator Javits, the original architect of § 4(0(2)
concurred in this sentiment: 'Welfare benefit levels for older workers may be reduced only to the
extent necessary to achieve approximate equivalency in contributions for older and younger work-
ers." 124 CONG. REc. 8218 (1978).
The legislative history of the 1978 ADEA amendments is particularly persuasive evidence of the
link between the original congressional intent of § 4(0(2) and the concept of cost-justification be-
cause two of the section's original sponsors were available to clarify the intent behind the provision;
namely, Senator Javits and Representative Hawkins. Urban, supra note 25, at 175. While the pas-
sage of the 1978 amendments clearly confronted Congress with the potential problem of employer
refusal to hire older employees, iL, the legislative history of the 1978 amendments to § 4(0(2) should
be given additional weight because Congress spoke of the need to ensure flexibility for employers at a
time when that need was particularly strong. By raising the age limits of the ADEA and prohibiting
involuntary retirement, the amendments lengthened the period of time over which an employer has a
duty to maintain a nondiscriminatory relationship with its older employees. Without the ability to
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Sion among the circuit courts. Such confusion would have been less
likely had these courts believed Justice Kennedy's interpretation of sec-
tion 4(f)(2) to be correct. In order to utilize the section 4(0(2) defense,
an employer must establish that age-related differential treatment is pur-
suant to the terms of a "bona fide employee benefit plan," and that the
plan is not a "subterfuge" employed to avoid compliance with the
ADEA. These terms imply that it is possible to have benefit differentials
outside of a bona fide plan, and furthermore that a bona fide plan could
be created only to evade the ADEA. Such evasive plans would be lawful
unless they fell under a prohibition of the Act, the only possible provision
being section 4(a)(1).
Prior to the Betts decision three types of cases commonly arose
under section 4(f)(2) - involuntary retirement, voluntary retirement,
and unequal benefit provision cases.90 Although the administrative agen-
cies responsible for the enforcement of the ADEA consistently recom-
mended that a cost-justification be shown before a benefit plan could be
deemed bona fide and not a subterfuge,91 considerable confusion arose in
reduce costs by reducing benefits to older employees, the 1978 amendments would have decreased
employer incentives to hire older workers.
This concern for in effect forcing employers to maintain high levels of benefits for older employees
has been most strongly embodied in the EEOC's (and consequently OWBPA's, by incorporation)
treatment of long-term disability benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(f)(ii) (1991) (permiting employers to
cease all payments of disability benefits to older persons under certain circumstances).
The language of these regulations indicates that the EEOC was fully conscious of the disagree-
ment between these exceptions and the policies behind the cost-justification rule:
[Tihe Department would not assert a violation where the level of benefits is not reduced
and the duration of benefits is reduced in the following manner:
(A) With respect to disabilities which occur at age 60 or less, benefits cease at age 65.
(B) With respect to disabilities which occur after age 60, benefits cease five years
after disablement. Cost data may be produced to support other patterns of reduction
as well.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(f)(ii) (1991) (emphasis added).
Nothing in OWBPA or its legislative history clearly suggests that this portion of the EEOC regu-
lation is invalid. However, one commentator reads the SUB integration of provision of OWBPA (see
infra Part II.E.3) as providing the only permissible reduction in retiree health benefits. See Mayer
Siegel & Carol Buckman, Protection for Older Workers, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 1990, at 3. Congress or
the EEOC should clarify whether regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(f)(ii) survives the passage of
OWBPA.
90. 2 EGLIT, supra note 38, at § 16.39C.
91. As a contemporaneous construction of a statute by its responsible enforcement agency, the
"equal benefit or equal cost" rule was entitled to great deference by the courts. See EEOC v. Associ-
ated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981) (stating that the EEOC's rules governing
disclosure of confidential information to charging parties are entitled to deference as a long-consis-
tent agency interpretation of Title VII § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-51b (1980)); Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34
(1971); United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1930). The circuit courts have invariably
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the district courts regarding the terms "bona fide plan" and "subterfuge"
within the meaning of 4(f)(2). Despite the clarity of the guidance offered
by the Department of Labor and Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, 92 the lower federal courts, prior to Betts, were given little gui-
dance as to the weight to be given these guidelines and regulations.
The district courts espoused contradictory interpretations of section
4(f)(2), choosing either to uphold or deny the cost-justification rule under
both the "bona fide plan" 93 language and the "subterfuge" language.
94
shown such deference by insisting on some business purpose or cost justification before allowing an
employee benefit plan to qualify for the § 4(0(2) exemption. See EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 869 F.2d 696, 710 (3d Cir.) (to qualify for a § 4(0(2) exemption, a plan must involve age-
related cost factors; i.e. the cost of providing benefits pursuant to the plan must increase with age),
vacated, 493 U.S. 801 (1989) (vacated in light of Public Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158
(1989)), on remand, 925 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1991); Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retarda-
tion, 848 F.2d 692, 694 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Under the Act, an age-based benefit plan which denies
disability retirement to older employees in favor of forcing length of service retirement is unlawful
unless it can be justified by a substantial business purpose."), rev'd sub nom. Public Empl. Ret. Sys.
v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989); EEOC v. City of Mt. Lebanon, 842 F.2d 1480, 1493 (3d Cir. 1988)
("The 'business purpose' requirement was set forth as a general means of allowing employers to
disprove improper motive for reducing older workers' benefits .... Requiring an employer to cost
justify its reduced benefit schedule to disprove subterfuge gives meaning to the 'legitimate business
purpose' showing."); Karlen v. City Colleges, 837 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.) ("[W]here... the em-
ployer uses age - not cost, or years of service, or salary - as the basis for varying retirement
benefits, he had better be able to prove a close correlation between age and cost if he wants to shelter
in the safe harbor of section 4((2)."), cert. denied sub nom. Cook County College Teachers Union
Local 1600 v. Trustees of Community College, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 725
F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Congress... meant to encourage the hiring of older workers by
relieving employers of the duty to provide them with equal benefits - where equal benefits would be
more costly for older workers.").
92. See 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1978) (codification of the 1969 Labor Department 1B setting forth the
basic cost-justification requirement); 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1979) (codification of the amended IB
previously published at 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264 (1978) (applying the cost-justification rule to various
employee benefits); 29 C.F.R. 1625-10 (1989) (EEOC's adoption of amended Labor 1B with minor
modification). For a general discussion of the chronology of these regulations, see Urban, supra note
25, at 176-79.
Of course, the courts are free to disregard agency interpretations as mere guidance. See, eg.,
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (the consistency of an agency's pronouncements
with its other announcements and with its empowering statute's language and history give the
agency the "power to persuade, if lacking power to control"), see also Betts, 492 U.S. at 171 ("[e]ven
contemporaneous and longstanding agency interpretations must fall to the extent they conflict with
statutory language"); Cohen, supra note 25, at 387-91.
93. Those courts which focused on the term "plan" differed as to whether a strict equal cost
justification was required. Some applied the cost-justification rule. See EEOC v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 618 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ohio 1985); EEOC v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 43 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 736 (E.D.N.C. 1987). Other courts did not; see, eg., Germann v. Levy, 553 F.
Supp. 700 (N.D. Ill. 1982); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (D.NJ.
1982), rev'd, EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
820 (1984), on remand, 651 F. Supp. 1172 (D.NJ. 1987) (summary judgment granted), and aff'd,
930 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1991).
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While the district courts offered a confusing panoply of authority for the
circuit courts, the circuits which addressed the issue of section 4(0(2)
unanimously reflected a concern that there be a strong business purpose
for benefits discrimination, while differing on the precise language they
used.9" Thus, Justice Kennedy's rejection of any form of the cost-justifi-
94. The only district to decide the meaning of the term "subterfuge" in § 4(0(2) prior to the
Supreme Court decision in Betts was the Western District of New York which chose not to adopt an
equal benefits, cost-justification approach in favor of a looser "legitimate business reason test" in
upholding an early retirement incentive. Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 700 F. Supp. 1199 (W.D.N.Y.
1988), vacated, 772 F. Supp. 1346 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (vacated in light of the Betts decision).
95. Prior to Betts, the Second Circuit consistently applied a "legitimate business purpose" test to
decide whether a plan was a subterfuge. See Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986);
Potenze v. New York Shipping Ass'n., 804 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1986). Other circuits have focused
more narrowly on the issue of "bona fide plan" and have come up with the same result. See Alford
v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Brennan v. Taft
Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). However, the Cipriano court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that an early retirement incentive plan could only be justified by "actuarially significant
cost reductions." 785 F.2d at 54. This language left open the possible interpretation that something
less than a "cost-justification" is required to avoid the label of subterfuge, and commentators have
disagreed as to whether Cipriano is a cost-justification case that was overruled by Betts. See 2A
EGLrr, supra note 38, at § 16.37 ("[S]ince the Betts Court threw the cost-justification rationale out
the legal window, so to speak, Crosland, Home Insurance Co., Cipriano, and City of Mt. Lebanon are
no longer valid rulings .... "). But see Act Hearing, supra note 47, at 252-53 (statement by Mark S.
Dichter on behalf of the Assoc. of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, the Nat'l Assoc. of Mfrs., and the ERISA Industry Comm. labelling the "business purposes
[test] as unequivocally looser than the cost-justification rule"). However, other circuits have explic-
itly adopted the cost-justification rule when evaluating plans. See EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984), on remand, 651 F. Supp. 1172
(D.N.J. 1987) (summary judgment granted), and aff'd, 930 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Bor-
den's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984); Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 848
F.2d 692 (1988), rev'd sub. nom Public Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 592 U.S. 148 (1989). Under the
"subterfuge" language, the Fourth Circuit followed the Second Circuit in requiring a "business or
economic purpose" test for determining whether a plan is a subterfuge. See Crosland v. Charlotte
Eye, Ear and Throat Hosp., 686 F.2d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 1982); Abenante v. Fulflex, Inc., 701 F.
Supp. 296 (D.R.I. 1988). However, "subterfuge" has also been interpreted under the cost-justifica-
tion rule. See EEOC v. City of Mt. Lebanon, 842 F.2d 1480, 1491 n.9 (3d Cir. 1988) (rejecting the
contention that a long term disability plan was a subterfuge because it had not proven that its re-
duced disability coverage had "achieve[d] approximate equivalency in the cost of providing benefits
to older and younger workers").
However, no circuit applied the cost-justification rule to a plan created before the ADEA was
passed. See EEOC v. County of Orange, 837 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting an age-cost test for
a pre-Act plan, and noting that the court is not bound by Department of Labor/EEOC interpretive
regulations); EEOC v. Cargill, Inc., 855 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1988) (no age-cost relationship required
in case of pre-Act plan); EEOC v. State of Maine, 655 F. Supp. 223 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd mem., 823
F.2d 542 (Ist Cir. 1987); see also EEOC v. Fox Point Bayside Sch. Dist., 772 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir.
1985); Carpenter v. Continental Trailways, 635 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986
(1981). These decisions however, do not constitute authority against the cost-justification rule, be-
cause they dealt with the procedural fairness of retroactive application of the ADEA and addressed
the cost-justification requirement only in dicta. The holdings of these cases were explicitly over-
turned by OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103(3), 104 Stat. 979 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
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cation requirement is inconsistent with the bulk of federal case law re-
garding the 4(f)(2) exception.
In determining the application of the section 4(f)(2) language re-
garding "subterfuge" and "bona fide" employee benefit plans, the Betts
majority followed United Air Lines, Ina v. McMann,96 which had de-
clared that the term "subterfuge" had to be given its ordinary meaning of
"a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion."97 The McMann
Court had reasoned that plans drafted prior to the ADEA (such as the
mandatory retirement plan utilized by United Air Lines) could not possi-
bly be subterfuges for the purposes of evading the Act.9" The McMann
Court did not explicitly discuss the cost-justification rule.99 The Betts
Court, however, rejected the cost-justification rule, finding it contrary to
the legislative history of the ADEA, °° and not implicated by the lan-
guage of section 4(f)(2). 101
Furthermore, the Betts majority's exclusion of employee benefits
from the ambit of the ADEA contradicts the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of virtually identical language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.102 Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, which contains the general
§ 623(k) (West Supp. 1991)) which states that "a seniority system or employee benefit plan shall
comply with this Act regardless of the date of adoption of such system or plan."
96. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
97. Id. at 203.
98. Id. at 204.
99. Id. Yet, the Supreme Court did state in dictum that "[wle reject any per se rule requiring an
employer to show an economic or business purpose in order to satisfy the subterfuge language of the
Act." Id at 203. The Supreme Court's unwillingness to apply the cost-justification rule was pre-
saged by their approval of the severance pay-pension integration in the case of Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 517 (1981), where the Court unanimously upheld the integration of
benefits as central to the accomplishment of the purposes of ERISA. The Court stated that the
"[clongressional purpose [of] ... promoting a system of private pensions by giving employers ave-
nues for cutting the cost of their pension obligations - underlies all such offset possibilities.").
Note that Congress specifically overruled McMann's validation of age-based mandatory retire-
ment by adding to § 4(0(2) a prohibition of employee benefit plans that required or permitted invol-
untary retirement based on age. See supra notes 87-89; Betts, 492 U.S. at 167. The Labor
Department then reasserted the traditional cost-justification meaning of the term "subterfuge." See
29 C.F.R. 1625.10 (1989).
100. Betts, 492 U.S. at 171.
101. Id. at 172.
102. Reference to the Supreme Court's treatment of these provisions is particularly apt because
4(a)(1) was adopted in haec verba to Title VII which was passed only three years earlier. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text. However, the Supreme Court did not pass on the scope of§ 4(a)(1)
in its only pre-Betts ruling on the § 4(f)(2) defense, United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192
(1977). Therefore, in order to evaluate Justice Kennedy's analysis of § 4(a)(1) according the princi-
ple of stare decisis we must look to the most similar question presented to the Court prior to the Betts
decision, which was found in Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983), and Los
Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1977).
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prohibition against discrimination,"°3 was interpreted in the gender dis-
crimination cases of Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris"4 and Los
Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart.0 5 Both of these cases were
brought under Title VII by female employees who were required by their
employers to contribute more to their pension funds than their male
counterparts."° In the course of striking down both programs as imper-
missible under Title VII, the Supreme Court expressly stated that dis-
crimination in employee benefits fell within the scope of the phrase
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." °107
103. The section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
104. 463 U.S. 1073 (1982).
105. 435 U.S. 702 (1977).
106. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705 (1982); Norris, 463 U.S. at 1077-80 (1982). The only significant
factual difference between the two cases was that in the latter, the employer gave employees the
option to purchase a pension from a variety of private pension plans rather than administering one
plan directly. This distinction was held legally irrelevant and the logic of Manhart was applied in
Norris. d at 1089. ( "There can be no serious question that petitioners are legally responsible for
the discriminatory terms [which employees are offered] .... ).
107. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1079 ('There is no question that the opportunity to participate in a
deferred compensation plan constitutes a 'conditional or privilege] of employment,' and that retire-
ment benefits constitute a form of 'compensation."' (citations omitted)); Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712
n.23 ("pension benefits, and the contributions that maintain them, are 'compensation' under Title
VII." (citations omitted)). It is interesting to note that although these gender discrimination cases
interpret the same prohibitive language as many ADEA cases in the circuit courts, the gender cases
reach markedly different results. This difference may be justified by the fact that there is no defense
similar to § 4(0(2) under Title VII. Central to the reasoning of both Manhart and Norris is the belief
that gender discrimination results from the improper use of unjustified gender-related generaliza-
tions. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707; Norris, 463 U.S. at 1083. In both cases, the Supreme Court
states that it is impermissible to assume that because women tend to live longer than men that any
particular female employee will live longer than the average male employee because the protections
of § 703(a)(1) are above all "individual" protections. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707-08 ("Even if the
statutory language were less clear, the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on fairness to
individuals rather than fairness to classes."); Norris, 463 U.S. at 1084. When § 4(0(2) has been
applied to severance pay reduction cases and involuntary retirement cases some courts have held
that age-based assumptions that a retirement eligible person would "retire anyway" are impermissi-
ble. See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981)
(using higher salary level as reason for not hiring teachers over 40 was a facially neutral policy
disproportionately disadvantaging members of a protected class); see also Cipriano v. Board of
Educ., 700 F. Supp. 1199, 1209, 1211 (W.D.N.Y. 1988), vacated, 772 F. Supp. 1346 (1991) (invali-
dating its earlier decision by interpreting ADEA § 4(a)(1) as inapplicable to fringe benefits under
Betts).
However, actuarially based expectations have not been struck down in an allegedly "fringe" bene-
fit context, such as pensions or health insurance provisions to older workers pursuant to a benefit
1992] OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION ACT 893
Having reaffirmed the common understanding of section 4(a)(1) of
plan, presumably because of § 4(f)(2)'s specific intention to keep benefit problems from frustrating
the hiring of older workers. See Abenante v. Fulflex, 701 F. Supp. 296 (D.R.I. 1988). Section 4(0(2)
allows benefit differentials in limited circumstances to allow flexibility in benefit provision so that
older workers will not be overlooked in the hiring process. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying
text. However, it is clear that no such cost justification is possible in the race or gender context.
Racial discrimination can never be justified on economic grounds because race is a "suspect classifi-
cation." See eg., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). As such, any use of race as a classifica-
tion must pass the test of strict judicial scrutiny. Gender is treated as a "quasi" suspect class
however, and the Supreme Court subjects gender discrimination to a test of "intermediate" scrutiny
somewhere between the rational classification test and the suspect classification test. See, ag., Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Despite the lower level of Constitutional protection afforded women
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Manhart majority rejected an argument that longevity was a
factor other than sex on which a benefit differential could be based under a potential safe harbor in
the Equal Pay Act. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 714 n.22 (construing the Equal Pay Act's provisions
against gender discrimination in employment compensation).
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate any reason for its differing protection of aged Americans
and women in the employment context. Perhaps such a difference could be justified under Justice
Stone's conception of a "discrete and insular minority" from which the test for suspectness was
derived. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Age was denied
suspect classification because the aged are not "discrete" and in need of extraordinary protection
from the sway of majoritarian politics. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313 (1976). Justice Powell's decision in the "wealth discrimination" case of San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) translated the discrete minority concept into a test for "sus-
pectness," namely a suspect class is one "saddled with... disabilities,... subjected to... a history
of purposeful unequal treatment,... [and] relegated to... a position of political powerlessness." Id.
at 28. The subjects of age discrimination range from octogenarians down to persons in their forties
or thirties, depending on profession. Perhaps on this basis, aged Americans are less discrete and
therefore merit less protection. Some circuits may have supplied a partial answer when they de-
clared that "[tihe progression of age is a universal human process," which thus tends to distinguish
age discrimination cases from "cases involving the immutable characteristics of race, sex and na-
tional origin." Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 n.4 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 422 U.S.
1045 (1975). See also Holley v. Sanyo Mfg. Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1166 (8th Cir. 1985) (repeating the
above quote from Laugesen); Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1428 (7th Cir. 1986);
Dabrowski v. Warner-Lambert Co., 815 F.2d 1076, 1079 (6th Cir. 1987). Similar reasoning may be
the unstated rationale for courts' acceptance of § 4(f)(2).
Scholars have strongly questioned the differential treatment of gender and race discriminating
constitutional jurisprudence. See PAuL BREST & SANFORD LavmNsN, PROCESSES OF CONSTU-
TIONAL DECISONMAKING 587-88 (suggesting that racial and gender discrimination be compared
with respect to the characteristics of race and gender as a trait); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism,
Sexis? and Preferential Treatment, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581 (1977) (arguing that gender discrimina-
tion can be seen as a more intractable social problem than racial discrimination because gender-
based prejudices are more deeply embedded in American culture and less-unanimously seen as un-
justifiable); Paul, supra note 15, at 988-89, 1036-39 (criticizing the treatment of age discrimination in
terms of constitutional law and Title VII principles); but see JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIS-
TRusT 154-70 (1980). An in-depth treatment of the Constitutional justifications for the Supreme
Court's treatment of race, age and gender discrimination are beyond the scope of this Comment
which is intended to assess the impact of OWBPA on the operation of the ADEA. Please note that
nothing in this Comment is intended to belittle the differing histories and social dynamics of the
various types of discrimination discussed in this footnote. Rather, criticism is levelled at courts'
reasoning in these areas.
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the ADEA, and having harmonized that provision with its Title VII
counterpart, OWBPA also reestablished the balance of evidentiary bur-
dens that was upset by the Betts decision.
C. Reaffirmation of Section 4(f)(2) as an Affirmative Defense
Prior to the Betts decision, the ADEA's section 4(1)(2) exemption of
bona fide benefit plans provided the employer with an affirmative defense
to charges of age discrimination.1"' Accordingly, once a plaintiff alleged
that the employer discriminated through the use of unequal benefits, the
employer bore the burden of proving that any benefit disparity was
merely part of a bona fide employee benefit plan.109 The majority in
Belts, however, held that section 4()(2) required the plaintiff employee to
prove "that the discriminatory plan provision actually was intended to
serve the purpose of discriminating in some non-fringe-benefit aspect of
the employment relation."110
OWBPA squarely rejects the Betts majority's interpretation of sec-
tion 4(f)(2). Section 103(1) of OWBPA replaces 4(f)(2), and includes a
new paragraph that explicitly and unequivocally states that the employer
bears the burden of showing that any benefit differential is justified by a
significant cost consideration. The proviso at the end of section 103(1) of
OWBPA states that "[ain employer, employment agency, or labor organ-
ization acting [under the new 4(0(2)] shall have the burden of proving
that such actions are lawful in any civil enforcement proceeding brought
under this Act .... "11  This provision correctly places the burden of the
section 4(0(2) defense not only where past administrative practice dic-
tates it be,112 but also where the Supreme Court itself had previously
108. 2 EGLir, supra note 38, at § 16.37; Urban, supra note 25, at 182-88.
109. 2 EGLrr, supra note 38, at § 16.34. The circuit courts that had dealt with § 4(0(2) prior to
the Betts decision firmly placed the burden of persuasion under that section on the employer. See,
eg., Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 848 F.2d 692 (6th Cir 1988), rev'd sub
nom. Public Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989); EEOC v. City of Mt. Lebanon, 842 F. 2d
1480 (3d Cir. 1988); Karlen v. City Colleges, 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cerL denied sub nom. Cook
County College Teachers Union Local 1600 v. Trustees of Community College, 486 U.S. 1044
(1988); Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d
1390 (9th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 820 (1984), on remand, 651 F. Supp. 1172 (D.NJ. 1987) (summary judgment granted), and
aff'd, 930 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1991); Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1977).
110. Betts, 492 U.S. at 181.
111. OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103(1), 104 Stat. 978, 979 (1990) (codified at 29
U.S.C.A. § 623(0(2) (West Supp. 1991)).
112. S. RFP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509,
1510.
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placed it.
113
D. Explicit Incorporation of the Cost-Justification Rule
Having clarified that ADEA section 4(f)(2) operated as an affirma-
tive defense, Congress expressly incorporated the cost-justification rule
into the ADEA, and thereby followed the consistent interpretation of the
Department of Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and the federal circuit courts that had interpreted section 4(f)(2). 114 Sec-
tion 103(1) of OWBPA replaces section 4(f)(2) with new language in or-
der to eliminate confusion as to the scope of the cost-justification rule1 5
and to convey forcefully that "the only justification for age discrimina-
tion in an employee benefit is the increased cost in providing the particu-
lar benefit to older individuals."
' 1 6
Not only does OWBPA remedy pre-Betts confusion about the exist-
113. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122-24 (1985).
114. Commentators have argued that the circuits have not unanimously endorsed the cost-justi-
fication rule by citing cases having to do with the retroactive application of the ADEA to plans
created before 1967. See Betts Hearing, supra note 6, at 113 (testimony of Mark S. Dichter, attorney,
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Phila., Pa.). However, the issue of the fairness of retroactivity under the
Due Process Clause is quite separate from what the ADEA requires of plans formulated post-
ADEA. The positions of the circuits on the inclusion of the cost-justification rule in the bona fide
plan defense is discussed supra at Part II.C. of this Comment. OWBPA explicitly applies the ADEA
to pre-1967 programs. See infra Part H.F.2. of this Comment.
115. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1534.
For a general explanation of the cost-justification or "equal cost-equal benefit rule," see supra notes
24-26, 83-89 and accompanying text. The confusing history of judicial interpretation of the pre-
OWBPA § 4(0(2) is detailed supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
116. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1523
(emphasis in original). It is true that even the new § 4(0(2) permits employers to discriminate in a
manner contrary to the general prohibitions of the ADEA, see supra Part I.B of this Comment, in a
fashion Justice Kennedy criticized as anomalous. Public Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 175
(1989). However, this concession to the economics of employing older workers is precisely the pur-
pose that has been underlying § 4(0(2) since its adoption in 1967. See supra notes 83-89 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, the language of the new § 4(0(2) inserted by OWBPA makes it clear that
this discrimination receives Congressional sanction only in clearly limited circumstances. Section
4(0(2) now requires employers:
(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not intended to evade the
purposes of (the ADEA], except that no such seniority system shall require or permit the
involuntary retirement of any individual ... because of the age of such individual; or
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of payment made or
cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than that made or incurred on
behalf of a younger worker... ; or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent with the... pur-
poses of this Act.
OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103(1), 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 623(f)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1991)).
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ence and importance of the cost-justification rule to a section 4(f)(2) de-
fense,117 OWBPA also clarifies the meaning of section 4(0(2) by
eliminating whatever confusion may have existed between the "legitimate
business purpose"11 standard and the cost-justification rule. OWBPA
does so by making cost justification the only means by which employee
benefit differentials may be justified. However, the inclusion of several
"carefully considered and carefully drawn exceptions" 119 to the cost-jus-
tification rule narrows the potentially broad impact of OWBPA.
E. Incorporation of Public Policy Exceptions: The Watering of the
Cost-Justification Rule
The exceptions to the cost-justification rule contained in OWBPA
are found in section 103(3), which adds section 4(1) to the ADEA. This
new section 4(1) merely mirrors the loose consensus of pre-Betts deci-
sions regarding a number of issues, and exempts certain variations in
pension and insurance benefits from section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA. These
exceptions to the cost-justification rule are, for the most part,
uncontroversial.
117. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text for full discussion of the confusion in the
lower federal courts as to the exact textual link between the cost-justification rule and § 4(0(2), and
as to the precise meaning of the rule.
118. See supra note 95 for a discussion of the potential divergence between the "legitimate busi-
ness purpose" test and the cost-justification rule. OWBPA also provides technical guidance as to
how employers are to calculate the costs of benefits they provide by resolving the pre-Betts legal
uncertainty as to whether the cost-justification rule could be satisfied by the benefits package ap.
proach or on a benefit-by-benefit basis. Prior to OWBPA, the EEOC allowed benefit packages to be
judged by the amount of total benefits in a package when comparing older and younger employees,
provided that a pension plan was not included in the package. See 29 C.F.R § 1625.10(d)(2) (1989).
For example, if an employer has two employee benefit plans, one providing life insurance
and the other long-term disability, and if age-based cost increases permitted a 10% re-
duction in each benefit, and if both benefits cost the same to provide, the benefit package
approach might permit the employer to provide the full amount of life insurance while
reducing the level of long-term disability by 20%.
Act Hearing, supra note 47, at 456 (testimony of EEOC Vice-Chairman Silberman). Under a benefit-
by-benefit approach, each benefit must be provided at an equal cost to older and younger employees
regardless of whether they are "integrated." By adopting the EEOC regulations, OWBPA incorpo-
rates provisions allowing both approaches. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10() (1991) (allowing a benefit-by-
benefit approach); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(c)(2)(ii) (1991) (allowing an employer to use the
package approach). Congress specifically intended the application of both of these principles. S.
REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1524.
119. S. RaP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1510.
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1. Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans. Section 103(3)
provides explicit protection for the standard range of pension plans. 120
Under "defined contribution" programs, 12 1 employers make contribu-
tions toward employees' retirement funds on a pro rata basis, spending
an equivalent amount on all employees in a given class, regardless of age.
However, a "defined benefit" plan would violate a strict reading of the
cost-justification rule because providing the defined benefit amount for
newly-hired, older employees is more costly to employers than providing
the same defined benefit to employees who were hired at a younger
age. 122
OWBPA permits employers to continue to provide "defined benefit"
pension plans under the ADEA while clarifying a theoretical problem
which was never seriously argued in front of the courts. Prior to Betts,
both the Ninth and Third Circuits had held that section 4(f)(2)'s phrase
"such as retirement, pension, or insurance plan" included only those ben-
efit plans that fit within the cost-justification rule. 2 3 Therefore, in these
courts, a defined contribution plan, although a retirement plan as defined
by ERISA, 124 would not necessarily be exempted by section 4(f)(2) be-
cause it lacked age-related costs.1 25 However, the legislative history of
120. See infra note 127. For a general discussion of the range of pension benefits available, see
supra note 83 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 83.
122. For example, consider employees A and B who are both retiring at the age of 62. A was
hired twenty years ago, while B was hired only five years before his retirement. Under their company
defined benefit plan, A and B are both entitled to $300 a week, approximately one-half their pre-
retirement salary. If A and B are assumed to reach the age of 72, A and B would receive $15,600
each in benefits over the last ten years of their lives. If the employer requires $15 per week from its
employees, A has contributed $15,600 towards his retirement. Therefore, in this extremely oversim-
plified (inflation-free and spouse/family benefit-less) example, the employer will spend nothing to
provide A his vested pension benefits. However, employee B has only placed $3,900 in his retire-
ment fund through his five years of $15 contributions. Therefore, the employer will pay $11,700
over ten years to provide B the benefit level to which he is entitled under the defined benefit plan.
Since A and B are the same age, there is no direct violation of the cost-justification rule at their
retirement, but this scenario illustrates how defined benefit plans violate the intent of the cost-justifi-
cation rule. Employees who are hired at a later age are, as a matter of straight mathematics, more
expensive to guarantee a benefit level. Therefore, employers have a clear economic disincentive to
hire a recently trained older person rather than a similarly experienced younger person for any
particular position. Section 4(f)(2) was originally passed to counteract this disincentive.
123. EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 725 F.2d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S.
820 (1984), on remand, 651 F. Supp. 1172 (D.N.J. 1987) (summary judgment granted), and aff'd,
930 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1991). See also EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding that § 4(f)(2) was created to "avoid disrupting pensions and other complex, on-going benefit
schemes").
124. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988).
125. Under such a counter-intuitive reading of § 4(f)(2) an employer could offer defined contri-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
section 4(f)(2) clearly indicates that pension plans that are recognized by
ERISA were meant to be legal under the ADEA.126 OWBPA explicitly
incorporates ERISA's standards as to what constitutes an employee pen-
sion benefit plan,127 thereby including standard pensions within the sec-
tion 4(f)(2) exemption.
2. Voluntary Early Retirement Incentives. Prior to the enactment
of OWBPA, some early retirement incentives had the potential to violate
the ADEA if they provided similarly situated younger employees with
greater amounts of wages and benefits than older employees.1 28 Section
103(1) of OWBPA authorizes employers to provide different amounts to
employees of differing ages by exempting specifically defined early retire-
ment incentives from the application of the cost-justification rule.
a. Legality of Voluntary Early Retirement Incentives. Section
103(1) of OWBPA states that it is not unlawful for an employer to follow
a bona fide plan which "is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan
consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes of this Act." 129 This
clause was inserted to explicitly protect voluntary early retirement pro-
grams,130 including the window programs thought to be threatened by
the strict application of the cost-justification rule.
bution plans in a discriminatory fashion, such as offering them only to employees of a given type who
were hired under the age of thirty-five, without fear of violating the ADEA. However, that same
employer could not do the same using defined benefit plans. Ironically, this reading of § 4(0(2)
would allow employers to use that form of pension plan whose procedural mechanisms are not
discriminatory, defined contribution plans, in a discriminatory manner.
126. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
127. OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103(2), 104 Stat. 978, 979 (1990) (codified at § 623
(1)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1991)) states that a plan will not violate the new § 4(0(2) solely because "an
employee pension benefit plan (as defined in section 3(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)) provides for the attainment of a minimum age as a condition of
eligibility for normal or early retirement benefits. .. ." The referenced portions of ERISA provide:
"[A] pension plan is any plan, fund, or program which (i) provides retirement income to employees,
or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of cov-
ered employment or beyond .... 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(2)(A)(1), 1002(2)(A)(2) (1988).
There has been considerable litigation regarding the nature of a "plan, fund or program" under
ERISA. At a minimum such an entity must have "intended benefits, intended beneficiaries, a source
of financing, and a procedure to apply for and collect benefits." Functionally, this is a broad defini-
tion of employee benefit plans. See, eg., Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir.
1982) (en banc).
128. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
129. OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103(1), 104 Stat. 978, 979 (1990) (codified at 29
U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1991)).
130. Involuntary retirement is per se discriminatory. See the discussion of United Air Lines,
Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977), supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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Most employers provide enhanced benefits or supplements for lim-
ited periods of time to encourage employees to elect early retirement -
so-called "windows of opportunity." '131 Early retirement supplements
are frequently offered as part of defined benefit plans,132 and these sup-
plements differ from temporary "early retirement subsidies."' 33
OWBPA purposefully avoids adding any new textual guidance to the
ADEA regarding window or "sweetener" programs of this type, choos-
ing instead to allow the analysis of these programs to continue on a
"case-by-case" basis.' 34 OWBPA requires the courts to determine
whether a voluntary early retirement incentive plan is "consistent with
the relevant purpose or purposes of [the ADEA].' 135 As Congress rec-
131. Act Hearing, supra note 47, at 200 (statement of Fred Rumack on behalf of the American
Assoc. of Private Pension and Welfare Plans). Employees may retire permanently, although "tem-
porary" retirement for a limited period of time may be an available option.
132. Id at 201. These payments often take the form of pension supplements. Sometimes Social
Security bridge payments are also used in this manner. See infra Part II.E of this Comment. Con-
gress sees these payments as having the "primary purpose and primary effect of continuing benefits
until an individual becomes eligible for an immediate and unreduced pension." S. REP. No. 263,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1530.
133. Such subsidies constructively increase the age of an employee who is retiring early to the
company's normal retirement age. For example, a fifty-five year old worker who wishes to retire
when her plan's normal retirement age is sixty-five would, under usual circumstances, receive an
actuarially reduced pension to reflect the fact that the employee would be receiving payments earlier
and over a longer period of time than an employee with the same number of years on the job who
retired at age sixty-five. In other words, her contribution would be spread out over ten more years.
Some programs either reduce or eliminate this actuarial reduction in order to promote early retire-
ment. Act Hearing, supra note 47, at 204-05. Under a strict application of the cost-justification rule,
many of these plans would not be permissible because younger employees would require a greater
amount of subsidization to approach or equal their full retirement payment.
134. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1533.
135. OWBPA § 103(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1991)). Congress
sees the ADEA as having the three purposes outlined in the Act itself: "to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in em-
ployment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment." S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1533 (citing the ADEA at 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988)).
Some commentators argue that early retirement incentives are inherently coercive devices, the use
of which directly conflicts with the purposes of the ADEA. See, eg., Paul, supra note 15, at 1050:
The reality is that a job or financial security is the gun which employers have been
pointing at older employees. The options given to an older employee in too many situa-
tions resemble a sailor walking the plank. Either the sailor jumps into the ocean and
hopes for the best or he returns to the ship only to be stabbed. The older employees in
[retirement incentive programs] are consistently faced with these two options.
While this characterization of the economic choices that face older employees in a voluntary early
retirement incentive unfortunately may be valid in many cases, Paul overstates the singlemindedness
of the antidiscriminatory intent underlying the ADEA. While Congress' opposition to age discrimi-
nation is clearly reflected in the evolving legislative history of the ADEA, see supra Parts L.A and
II.B. of this Comment, Congress' concern for promoting the hiring of older workers by allowing
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ognized, this language unequivocally places the courts back into the pre-
Betts legal framework under which such incentives were judged accord-
ing to both their voluntariness,136 and the legitimacy of the differentia-
tions made between participants in terms of eligibility and/or level of
participation.
Under the ADEA, claims that early retirement was involuntary turn
on a factually-based, reasonable person analysis of whether the employ-
ees to whom a retirement incentive was offered had no choice but to
accept the incentive.1 37  Prior to OWBPA, the circuit courts applied
slightly different tests to determine the legality of these early retirement
employers flexibility when they are faced with age-related costs is also strongly expressed in the
§ 4(0(2) exemption and its legislative history. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. The
characterization of early retirement incentives as discriminatory within the context of the cost-justifi-
cation rule is entirely fair. However, truly voluntary early retirement incentives are not antithetical
to the overall intent of the ADEA.
136. The Senate Report explaining OWBPA commented:
Because early retirement incentive plans, by definition, target older workers, the circum-
stances surrounding their implementation must be carefully analyzed to ensure that they
provide older workers with an uncoerced and free choice. Employees eligible.., must
be given sufficient time to consider their options [and] ... complete and accurate infor-
mation regarding the benefits available under the plan.
S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1532.
137. These cases are most urgent during layoffs and plant closings when threats of sudden lay-
off, intimidation or subtle coercion can be used to influence older workers to retire. See Paolillo v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 821 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1987). The analysis utilized in these cases is akin to
the reasonable person test of constructive discharge cases. See generally Paul, supra note 15, passim
(viewing early retirement incentives as inherently coercive). Courts have applied constructive dis-
charge/involuntary retirement analysis to those plaintiffs stranded by the prospective application of
OWBPA. See infra note 182, see, e.g., Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 58 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 191, 205 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 1992) (complaint filed by three plaintiffs who utilized early retire-
ment incentives was dismissed when the court found that they had voluntarily retired and failed to
"make out a claim of constructive discharge"); Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 767 F. Supp.
867, 877 n.12 (N.D. II. 1991).
To the extent ascertainable, OWBPA now follows the Equal Opportunity in Employment Com-
mission's position on window programs. The EEOC's regulations prohibit window programs be-
cause they offer more incentives to younger employees than to older employees. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.10(d) (1991) (requiring a cost justification to avoid being deemed a subterfuge within the
meaning of § 4(0(2)). However, the EEOC has recognized that businesses and employees may bene-
fit under a well-designed early retirement incentive program which gives enough incentive to em-
ployees so as not to distort their economic calculation of whether to retire, and which provides
employers the economic benefit of a relatively painless reduction in the workforce. The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission views an unequal provision of incentive payments as permissible
so long as the plan is truly voluntary and the benefit differential is based on an assessment of increas-
ing cost or declining benefit to the employer in providing the incentive across the board. See EEOC's
Amicus Curiae Memorandum, Cipriano v. Board. of Educ., 700 F. Supp. 1199 (W.D.N.Y. 1988),
vacated, 772 F. Supp. 1346 (W.D.N.Y. 1991), Civ. No. 84-CV-80C, 5 (1987), reprinted in Act Hear-
ing, supra note 47, at 97.
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incentives. 38 To resolve this divergence, section 103(1) of OWBPA
firmly places the burden of proving voluntariness on the employer.
139
Section 4(0(2) has traditionally played an important role in the
analysis of voluntary incentive plans that are challenged by employees
who alleged that they were treated differently than others, by having
been excluded from an offered program or offered a lesser incentive to
retire.1" Such problems arise when employers offer early retirement in-
centives to younger employers while offering no or lesser incentives to
employees who are close to retirement age, based on the employer's ex-
pectation that the older employees will be retiring soon and do not need
additional incentives to retire. Unfortunately, the case law addressing
these issues is a circular recitation of the voluntariness rationale and the
cost-justification rule, which provides very little guidance for litigants
138. The Second Circuit applied a "voluntariness" test to determine whether an incentive was
legal under the ADEA. See Paolillo v. Dresser, 821 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1987). This case is some-
times referred to as Paolillo II because the Second Circuit withdrew an earlier opinion decided under
the McDonnell-Douglas standard for Title VII forced retirement cases. In the Paolilo case, three
employees were given less than three days to decide whether to take an early retirement plan. See
Paofillo I, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 338, withdrawn, 821 F.2d 81. The court concluded that
"the shortness of time given to appellants to make a decision [and] ... the apparent complexity of
the options open to them certainly raised a material issue as to whether [the plaintiffs] were given
sufficient time to make a considered choice." Paoliflo II, 821 F.2d at 84 (noting that in its with-
drawn opinion the court also took cognizance of the brevity of the time period plaintiffs had to
decide on taking the program.). For a general discussion of the withdrawn Paolillo I opinion, see
Paul, supra note 15, at 1031-36 (praising Paolillo Ias an accurate rendition of the legislative intent of
the ADEA).
The Seventh Circuit required plaintiffs in early retirement cases to satisfy the more difficult stan-
dards applied in constructive discharge cases. See Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d
824, 826 (7th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that (1) the employer made his or her
working conditions so intolerable that involuntary resignation was effectively forced upon the em-
ployee, and (2) that the employee would have been discharged in violation of the ADEA if he or she
had not already retired. Id at 829-30. While rejecting the particular plaintiffs' claim, the Henn court
also cited voluntariness as a relevant factor to consider. Id at 828-29.
139. In the flush language below, the new § 4(f)(2)(B) of the ADEA states that the employer
"shall have the burden of proving that such actions are lawful in any civil enforcement proceeding
brought under this Chapter." 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Supp. 1991). Nothing in the Act im-
plies that constructive discharge cases will no longer occur. Various types of harassment could still
occur which could make a sham of the seemingly voluntary acceptance of a well-written, well-timed
proposal. However, by placing the burden on the defendant to prove compliance in the simple early
retirement case, OWBPA prevents the constructive discharge rationale from forcing plaintiffs to bear
the burden of proof in ADEA early retirement cases. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission itself acknowledged that this was the implication of the Henn line of cases. See MINORY
REPORT or S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 53 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1558.
"Since... the determination whether the retirements were voluntary must be resolved within the
context of Section 4(a)(1), it follows inexorably that the plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of persua-
sion." Id. (citing the amicus curiae brief of the EEOC in Paolillo 1).
140. 2 EGLIT, supra note 38, at § 16.64.
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and courts attempting to determine the legality of early retirement
incentives.141
Cases involving differential inclusion have injected further uncer-
tainty into analysis under the section 4(f)(2) exemption by relying on a
determination of the employer's purposes behind offering a greater incen-
tive to younger employees. For example, in Britt v. E. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 42 an enhanced severance program was offered to em-
ployees who were pension-eligible and employees who were not. The for-
mer were required to defer their pension plans, while the latter were not.
The court reasoned that no discrimination had occurred because sever-
ance is merely a substitute for income, and both pension-eligible and inel-
igible employees merely deferred their pensions in order to receive
"wages" in the present.143 This test is applied by comparing the purposes
of the differential treatment involved with the purposes of the ADEA.1 44
This highly subjective analysis has allowed courts to uphold plans which
resulted in large differentials between younger and older employees.145
141. Some courts have upheld a retirement incentive under the "voluntariness" rule, where par-
ticipation was "strictly optional with the employees." See, eg., Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 346
(5th Cir. 1978); see also EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1986),
aff'd, 869 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.), vacated, 493 U.S. 801 (1989) (vacated in light of Public Emp. Ret. Sys.
v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)), and on remand, 925 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1991). For example, the case of
Patterson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 709, 742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984), involved a plan which
offered a $10,000 lump sum to teachers at age 55 and a lump sum reduced by $500 for each year a
teacher was older than age fifty-five for each year thereafter. The plaintiff, who was 67 when she
retired, was ineligible for the retirement plan because of her age. In upholding this plan the court
cited to Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d at 345.
Other courts have held retirement incentives to be within the realm of the "legitimate business
purpose" that courts substitute for the cost-justification rule. See Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785
F.2d 51, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that the retirement incentive was within the realm of "legiti-
mate business purpose"). See also cases cited supra note 95.
142. 768 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985).
143. Id at 594-95.
144. See Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1429 (7th Cir. 1986) (plan where younger
workers benefitted more than workers over age seventy-five because equal monthly payments were
made to each retired worker until the sum of age and years worked reached seventy-five, served the
"ADEA purpose" of providing financial support to families of workers).
145. See Karlen v. City Colleges, 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cook County
College Teachers Union Local 1600 v. Trustees of Community College, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988). In
Karlen, a voluntary retirement program offered lump sum payments for unused sick leave which
decreased as the age of the recipient rose. Id. at 316. Workers under sixty-five received payments
equal to 80% of their accumulated sick leave. Those over 65 received only 45%. The court stated
that the Board showed a legitimate business reason because it needed to offer greater incentives to
younger employees to get them to retire. Id. at 323. The fact that being released from salary obliga-
tions of the younger group of employees saved the City $818,074 as opposed to the $193,256 netted
through offering the same incentive to older workers illustrated the wisdom of the program. Id. at
324. In a real sense, the ends justified the means. The court further reasoned that the differential
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While nothing in OWBPA prohibits the type of distorted mathematics
utilized by these cases, the ADEA's differentiation between the purposes
of severance pay and pension benefits makes it unlikely that courts will
be able to rely on this "wage substitute" rationale in severance-pension
integration cases in the future. 46
b. Pension Supplements. OWBPA allows employers to utilize two
common retirement incentives - supplemental unemployment compen-
sation benefit payments (SUBs) and social security bridge payments.
SUBs are payments made to employees who are eligible for retirement
was a legitimate cost-adjustment because it reflected the fact that older employees had accumulated
more sick leave. Id. at 325-27.
146. However, this "wage substitute" rationale need not be viewed only as a weapon available to
the employer. As suggested by Niall Paul, this argument may provide relief to plaintiffs who will be
subject to the Betts decision, prior to the effective date of OWBPA. See Paul, supra note 15, at 1643-
45. The argument flows from the following dictum in Betts:
[W]hile § 4(0(2) generally protects age-based reductions in fringe benefits, an employer's
decision to reduce salaries for all employees while substantially increasing benefits for
younger workers might give rise to an inference that the employer was in fact utilizing its
benefits plan as a subterfuge for age based discrimination in wages, as an activity forbid-
den by § 4(a)(1).
Betts, 492 U.S. 180.
If a plaintiff can show that younger employees are being given benefits in lieu of their normal
salary, and that their older counterparts receive lesser amounts of these benefits, a court may hold
that the older employees receiving a lesser amount of benefits are in fact receiving a reduced amount
of wages, in violation of the ADEA. At least one court has viewed an otherwise "fringe" benefit as a
form of wages, and not merely as a fringe benefit. See Britt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 768
F.2d 593, 595 (4th Cir. 1985) (viewing severance pay provided under a voluntary workforce reduc-
tion as a wage substitute and not a fringe benefit); see also Paul, supra note 15, at 1046. This argu-
ment makes economic sense in that fringe benefits are often viewed as substitutes for wages (by both
employers and employees). See supra note 47.
One court has utilized this line of logic to prevent a harsh application of the Betts standard. In
Bell v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 761 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ind. 1991), Purdue University's defined
contribution pension plan ceased to contribute to a worker's pension at the end of the fiscal year in
which that employee reached the normal retirement age of sixty-five. Id. at 1362. The Bell plaintiffs
alleged that employer contributions to pension funds were "in the nature of basic compensation,
[and] that § 4(0(2) does not even apply." Id. at 1363. The court denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment because the court could not "conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable jury
could not infer from [the] facts that Purdue 'uiliz[ed] its pension plan as a subterfuge for age-based
discrimination in wages."' Id. at 1367 (citing Betts, 492 U.S. at 180).
However, since the enactment of OWBPA, other courts have strictly applied the Betts Court's
interpretation of § 4(f)(2), which leaves the burden of proof of subterfuge on the plaintiff. See Finne-
gan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 867, 874 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (limitation on airline
employees' accrued vacation time held outside the scope of § 4(0(2) analysis because the claim al-
leged disparate impact without evidence of intent to subvert the ADEA); Darchuk v. Kellwood Co.,
56 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1579 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 18, 1991) (exclusion from benefit increases
held not to violate § 4(0(2) as a "facial subterfuge" in the absence of evidence of intent to evade the
ADEA). These courts, finding plaintiffs unable to bear the burden of proof of subterfuge, avoided
further analysis of the nature of the relationship between fringe benefits and wages.
904 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
prior to reaching their employer's normal retirement age, and who are
thereby eligible to receive proportionately reduced retirement benefits.147
Employers often provide SUBs to close the gap between the amount of
reduced pension pay an early retirement-eligible employee would receive
and the full pension amount the employee will receive upon reaching the
employer's normal retirement age.'4 ' OWBPA section 103(2), which
adds new section 4()(1)(B) to the ADEA, allows an employer to offer
SUBs which are provided for as part of a "defined benefit plan" offered
by that employer. 149 Congress inserted this authorization of SUBs to ex-
plicitly provide a safe harbor for these payments, which would otherwise
be invalidated by the cost-justification rule. 5'
Similarly, OWBPA section 103(2), which adds new section
4()(1)(B)(ii) to the ADEA, expressly permits the use of social security
bridge payments - pension supplements that are calculated to supple-
ment an employee's social security benefits rather than his or her pension
payments,' 5 1 so long as the total of the social security and supplement
147. S. RaP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 1529;
Alan M. Koral & Neil A. Capobianco, Voluntary Reductions in Force, in REDUCTIONS IN
WORxFORCE AND BENEFITS IN A SHRINKING ECONOMY § C (Litigation and Administrative Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series ed., 1991).
148. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1530.
149. OWBPA § 103(2), codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(1)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1991). The re-
quirement of "permanence" stems from this provisions incorporation of ERISA's definition of a
"defined benefit plan." See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1988). While Congress intended ADEA
§ 4(i)(1)(B) to allow these supplements as well as Social Security bridge payments on a permanent
basis, OWBPA legislative history suggests that an employer could argue that the temporary use of
these benefits is legal under the general authorization of voluntary retirement incentives of ADEA
§ 4(O(2)(B):
If one of the programs described in section 4(1)(1) is offered on a temporary basis, it
may be lawful under section 4(f)(2)(B) if the employer proves that such a program is
voluntary and furthers the purposes of the Act. No inference as to the status of such
temporary programs under section 4(f)(2)(B) is to be drawn from the existence of section
46)(1).
S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1527.
150. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1526.
The legislative history of OWBPA implies that employers are not required to treat SUBs as an "all
or nothing" proposition. See id. (describing defined benefit plans which "forego the imposition of
part or all of the permissible actuarial reduction" without criticism). Without OWBPA's approval,
SUBs would violate the cost-justification rule, because, for example, a fifty-eight year old employee
would require greater supplemental payments to achieve the equivalent of full retirement benefits
than would a sixty year old employee. Because the older employee's early retirement payments
would be subjected to a smaller actuarial reduction, her actual retirement payments would be larger
than the younger employee's, thereby requiring a smaller employer-paid subsidy. Cf. supra note 133
and accompanying text.
151. OWBPA § 103(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 6230)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1991)). S. REP.
No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1526; Walter W. Miller,
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payments does not exceed the amount the employee would receive at age
sixty-two.152 Social security supplements violate the cost-justification
rule because an employer will pay more, for example, to a fifty-nine year
old than a sixty year old in order to ensure that each receives the
equivalent of his or her full social security benefits. Without an explicit
exception protecting them from the scope of the cost-justification rule,
bridge payments would not qualify for the section 4(f)(2) exemption.
3. Integration of Severance Pay and Retirement-related Benefits.
In an effort to extend the maximum level of benefits to the largest
number of workers, employers design plans which offset the payment of
one type of benefit against an entitlement payment. The variety and
complexity of benefit packages have increased over the last twenty years,
as employers developed separate pieces of benefits packages designed to
meet the demands of various employees whose needs were inadequately
covered under preexisting compensation scales.153 Benefit integration
can occur as a permanent feature of a company's pension plan or as a
sudden cost-shaving tactic in the face of impending work-force reduc-
Jr., Revised Age-Discrimination Law Covers Plans for Older Workers; Age-Discrimination Act Now
Covers BenefitsADEA Aims for Equality, NAT'L. L., May 20, 1991, at 26. When employees reach
the age of sixty-two, some employers stop these payments all together, or reduce them to reflect the
employee's eligibility for reduced unemployment benefits. Others pay the full amount until age
sixty-five, the age of eligibility for full social security benefits. See Title II of the Social Security Act,
Subchapter II, Federal Old-Age, Survivor's & Disability Income Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et. seq.
(1988). Medicare is intended to be treated similarly. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 21,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1527. The employer bears the burden of showing that such payment
offsets qualify for the § 4(1)(1) exception to the prohibition contained in ADEA § 4(a)(1). Id. at 22,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1527. Accord, Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir.
1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); EEOC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 786, 786 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); see also Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp.
715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part & rev'd in part without opinion, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
152. See OWBPA § 103(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. 623(1)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1991) (author-
izing social security supplements that do not exceed such old-age insurance); S. REP. No. 263, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess. 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1526. The legislative history of OWBPA
does not provide an explicit rationale for this limitation. However, a number of possible theories
make sense in light of OWBPA's reaffirmation of the cost-justification rule. Because Congress' ap-
proval of bridge payments compromises the non-discrimination principle of the cost-justification
rule, Congress used the maximum social security payments as the upper boundary to limit the extent
of this compromise. Further, if entirely excessive supplements were allowed, the employee's volun-
tariness (as required under § 4(f)(2)(B)(ii)) would be undermined as the economic incentive to retire
became too great, in a manner reminiscent of "Don Corleone's... offer he can't refuse." See Henn
v. National Geographic Society, 819 F.2d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 1987); Paul, supra note 15, at 997-98.
153. See Act Hearing, supra note 47, at 408 (Statement of the American Iron and Steel Institute
and the National Association of Manufactures. AISI is a not-for-profit trade association of 43 firms,
operating in 43 states. National Association of Manufacturers is an association of over 13,500 com-
panies operating in all fifty states who produce more than 80 percent of the nation's manufacturers.).
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tions. However, critics warn that younger employees gain more than
their older coworkers when non-retirement benefits are integrated with
pensions.154 Section 103(2) of OWBPA, adding new ADEA section
4(1)(2)(A), defines when the integration of various benefits with pensions
is acceptable, by emphasizing that the integration of the enumerated ben-
efits under the section must be based on a "contingent event unrelated to
age."
1 55
a. Retiree Health Benefits. The new ADEA section 40)(2)(A) al-
lows severance pay to be reduced by the amount of retiree health benefits
and/or pension benefits for which an employee is eligible following a
"contingent event unrelated to age." 156 The events unrelated to age con-
templated by the Act are those which trigger the payment of severance
154. See Betts Hearing, supra note 6, at 154-55 (testimony of Christopher Mackaronis). This
argument is best illustrated by simple example.
Assume the plant is about to lay off all of its employees at a particular plant and that the company
has a normal retirement age of 65, at which time an employee's retirement benefits are one percent of
the employee's monthly salary times the number of years of service. Assume that layoffs result in a
lump sum severance payment of weekly pay multiplied by the number of years of service. A 45 year-
old employee (employee A) with 20 years of service will fare better in this layoff than his 65-year-old
counterpart (employee B) with equal experience.
Employee A is entitled to a $10,000 lump sum payment immediately upon the layoff. ($500 salary
x 20 years). At his retirement at age 65, A will also be entitled to $400/month (1% x $2,000 in
average monthly salary).
Employee B will receive no severance pay at layoff if complete integration is allowed. He receives
only a $400 monthly retirement payment. The only difference between these employees is their age.
See Act Hearing, supra note 47, at 301 (testimony of Christopher Mackaronis). However, this is the
most stark and simple example of "complete integration." Many companies allow employees to
become eligible for retirement at earlier ages such as forty and forty five at rates that are actuarially
reduced from the firms "normal retirement" pay-scale. See supra Part II.E.2. Moreover, employers
could choose to offset severance pay by only a percentage of an employee's authorized retirement
payments.
155. OWBPA § 103(2)(A)(ii), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104 Stat. 2287 (1990) (codified
at 29 U.S.C.A. 6230)(2)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1991)).
156. The Act reads:
(2)(A) It shall not be a violation [of the ADEA] solely because following a contingent
event unrelated to age
(i) the value of any retiree health benefits received by an individual eligible for an
immediate pension;
(ii) the value of any additional pension benefits that are made available solely as a
result of the contingent event unrelated to age and following which the individual is
eligible for not less than an immediate and unreduced pension;
(iii) ... are deducted from severance pay made available as a result of the contin-
gent event unrelated to age.
OWBPA § 103(2), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104 Stat. 2287 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 6230)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991)).
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pay, such as plant closings or layoffs.
157
Prior to the Betts decision, the legal status of severance pay integra-
tion was uncertain. 158 Courts that had struck down the integration of
severance pay with pension plans based their decisions on the differing
purposes of pension benefits and severance pay. For example, the court
in EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,5 9 (Westinghouse I1) reasoned
that while severance pay was designed as a short term mechanism to
enable out-of-work employees to find new employment, pensions were
designed to provide for long term income security. Therefore, these ben-
efits could not be considered together as part of a bona fide plan, and
their integration violated the ADEA. 16 Other courts held specific sever-
ance integration plans to be discriminatory based on the specific manner
in which they were negotiated, 6' leaving unresolved the merits of sever-
ance integration generally. However, other courts have found integrated
severance packages to be acceptable under ERISA and/or nonviolative
of the ADEA. 16 2
157. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1529.
158. See Reinhart, supra note 83, at 1082 (remarking that such integration schemes could be
viewed as legal to the extent to which they are bona fide employee benefit plans).
159. 869 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.), vacated, 493 U.S. 801 (1989) (vacated in light of Public Emp. Ret.
Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)), and on remand, 925 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1991).
160. 869 F.2d at 710 (focusing on the fact that age-related cost factors are not involved in
severance pay); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 1983) (Westinghouse
1), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984), on remand, 651 F. Supp. 1172 (D.NJ. 1987) (summary judg-
ment granted), and aff'd, 930 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1991).
161. See e.g., EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) (severance payment pro-
gram not integrated with pension plan because severance pay plan was negotiated only two months
prior to the plant closing and was contained in letters separate from both the collective bargaining
agreement and the documents describing the company's pension, retirement and insurance plans);
EEOC v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 736 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
162. Both layoff pay (i.e. separation pay calculated at a different rate than normal discharge
severance pay) and severance pay have been held by various Courts to be "welfare benefit plans"
under ERISA. See, e.g., McClendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1499 (D.N.J.
1985); Mamula v. Satralloy, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 563, 566 (S.D. Ohio 1983); EEOC v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (D.N.J. 1982) (layoff income and pension benefit plan is a
"welfare plan" within the terms of ERISA). On the status of severance pay under ERISA, see, e.g.,
Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Scott v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502-04 (9th Cir. 1985).
ERISA cases have classified severance pay as a "Welfare" benefit under ERISA regulations or
under the statute itself. See eg., Gilbert, 765 F.2d at 325; Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 n.2
(9th Cir. 1985) (severance pay is an unemployment benefit within § 1002(1)(A) or under ERISA
regulations); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (regulation 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510.3-(I)(a)(3) (1986) "includes[s] within the definition of 'welfare plan' those plans which pro-
vide holiday and severance benefits"); see also Britt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 768 F.2d 593
(4th Cir. 1985) (rejecting challenge to provision of a severance pay plan which limited severance
benefits to employees who had deferred their pension eligibility); Parker v. FMNA, 741 F. 2d 975
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Section 103(2) of OWBPA, which adds ADEA § 4(1)(2), allows in-
tegration of severance pay with health benefits and pension payments,
but only for persons who became eligible for pension payments because
of an impending layoff.'63 In passing OWBPA, Congress recognized that
severance payments and pension benefits were separate, unrelated bene-
fits, 16 yet legislators were sensitive to the needs of employers to flexibly
allocate their scarce resources at the time of a plant closing or layoff
period. 165  The new ADEA section 4(l)(2) represents a compromise
among the policy positions of the EEOC, advocates for older persons,
and industry. OWBPA allows severance pay to be integrated with retiree
health benefits, and consequently one admittedly illegal pre-Betts practice
is now permitted under the ADEA.
166
(7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting challenge to policy which gave employees the choice between retiring or
taking severance pay); but see Allessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504, 519-21 (1981) (stating
in dictum that the integration of layoff benefits with pension benefits may be impermissible under
ERISA because IRS rulings consider layoff benefits as not comparable to benefits offered in a quali-
fied pension plan).
Severance integration has also been upheld under the ADEA. See Abenante v. Fulflex, 701 F.
Supp. 296 (D.II. 1988) (the integration of pension and severance benefits permissible under the
ADEA when pursuant to a bona fide plan that "exists and pays benefits"); EEOC v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 650 F. Supp. 1561 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (approving of integration of pension and
severance benefits); Khan v. Grotnes Metalforming Systems, 679 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. I11. 1988)
(ADEA violation where enhanced early retirement benefits are given instead of severance pay).
163. OWBPA § 103(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 6231)(2) (West Supp. 1991)). The "contin-
gent event" requirement will prevent companies from first firing an individual for an allegedly non-
discriminatory reason, and then reducing his pension by a severance offset.
164. The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee stated that OWBPA did not allow
benefits to be coordinated with severance payments:
First, pension benefits are age-related .... Accordingly, it is per se age discrimination to
use pension eligibility as a basis for denying an older worker any other benefit. Second,
pension benefits are special under federal law. Unlike severance (or any other benefits),
pensions are protected through statutory vesting provisions; they are guaranteed
[through ERISA's reporting, financing and fiduciary obligations] .... It would make
little sense for Congress to accord special status to pension eligibility under ERISA and
then allow the status to be used under the ADEA as a basis for eliminating other em-
ployee benefits.
S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1528-29.
In response to this type of argument, industry representatives bolster their policy argument for
severance integration by highlighting the hardship of young workers with family obligations who
will not have a guaranteed stream of income after unemployment insurance runs out. Id. at 22, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1527. Thus, their need for a lump sum payment spread out over time is said to be
greater.
165. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1529.
166. OWBPA § 103(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 6230)(2) (West Supp. 1991)). The amount of
health benefit integration depends on each individual employee's retirement status. The provisions
are aimed at plans that provide retiree health benefits in addition to regular pensions. If an employee
is eligible for retirement as of the layoff event, his or her severance pay may be reduced by the
actuarially-computed value of any retiree health benefits he or she is allowed. For those employees
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It is uncertain whether OWBPA will provide adequate protection
for older workers once employers begin to test the limits of the integra-
tion of health benefits and pensions now allowed under the ADEA.
While OWBPA inserts protections into the ADEA to insure that em-
ployers do not use meager health benefits to offset severance pay1 67 and
to assure uniform valuation of health benefits for severance reduction,16
there is no guarantee that these protections will prevent pensions and
severance arrangements from being drastically altered through integra-
tion, thereby providing older laid-off employees with inadequate financial
protection. While some evidence suggests that employers may be inflexi-
ble in their benefit practices and therefore unlikely to respond to any
slight loosening of present law. 16 9 However, it is possible that employers
will attempt to lower the costs associated with work force reductions by
either reallocating severance benefits from non-pension eligible workers
who are not yet eligible for their full pension benefit, but are eligible to take an unreduced total
pension level because of the layoff event, the employer may, pursuant to a plan or agreement, reduce
the severance payment by the difference between the actuarially reduced pension and the full lay-off
pension. This payment may be reduced to the extent the difference is made up by special, layoff
retiree health benefits. Id. at 1529. OWBPA provides that any plan which requires actuarially re-
duced pensions to be taken can offset severance pay with retiree health benefits, only after the retiree
health benefits are also proportionally reduced, for the purposes of calculating the severance effects.
Id at 1530.
167. OWBPA § 103(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(0)(2)(D)(i) (West Supp. 1991)), which
applies to workers under the age of 65, requires that health plans provide at least as much coverage
as Medicare (Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq. (1988)). S. REP. No.
263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1530. OWBPA § 103(2) (codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C.A. § 6230)(2)(D)(ii) (West Supp. 1991)) requires that the health benefit given to
employees over the age 65 be equivalent to at least one fourth the coverage of Medicare. Id This
difference accounts for the fact that persons over the age of 65 become eligible for Medicare.
168. OWBPA § 103(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623()(2)(E) (West Supp. 1991)) provides a
valuation scale for retiree health benefits providing a higher value for those benefits which are of
unlimited duration. See Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103(2)(E)(i),(ii), 104 Stat. 978, 980 (1990). These
figures were taken from a medical cost survey conducted by the General Accounting Office and are
to be adjusted annually according to the Medical Component Section of the Consumer Price Index.
S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1531.
169. Act Hearing, supra note 47, at 344 (statement of Douglas S. McDowell, General Counsel,
Equal Employment Advisory Council (representing an association of employers and trade associa-
tions)). The most persuasive argument to that effect is that employers will find benefit reductions to
be economically detrimental as they become increasingly reliant on older workers. The Department
of Labor has recently reported that "[w]hile the declining number of workers means that companies
that can attract and retain productive older workers will have to take steps to improve the dynamism
of an aging workforce, it also means that companies will most successfully meet the challenge of a
tight market for skilled labor." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OPPORTUNYry 2000 at 147 (1988). An
assumption of inflexibility in the offering of benefits is supported by the fact that employers have not
sought to reduce long-term disability benefits because they are not integratable with pension benefits.
Cf Act Hearing, supra note 47, at 526 (responses of Kevin McCarthy, Vice-President of UNUM (an
association of insurance companies, the leading provider of disability benefits in the nation)).
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to pension-eligible employees 17 or by increasing the proportion of healthbenefits to pension benefits provided by their retirement plans. 171
b. Pension Supplements. Subject to the "contingent event" re-
quirement, as discussed above, 172 OWBPA section 103(3), which adds
new ADEA section 4(1)(2)(C), allows employers to offset SUBs against
severance pay. 1 73  Without this provision, SUB integration could be
barred by OWBPA's prohibition of severance-pension integration, be-
cause SUBs are necessarily calculated with reference to an employee's
retirement payments, and are explicitly designed to supplement reduced
pension payments for early retirees. SUBs could be viewed as pension
payments, and the integration of SUBs and severance pay would there-
fore be prohibited by OWBPA. However, Congress remedied this prob-
170. This possible manipulation of benefit packages under severance integration of OWBPA
was sharply criticized by Senator Grassley who saw it as "tantamount to a mandatory retirement
policy." 136 CONG. REC. S13,608 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Grassley).
171. Although the bargaining process (collective or individual) preceding the implementation of
such insurance-skewed plans may serve to limit the scope of these benefit shifts, it must be
remembered that bargaining employees are, to an extent, at the mercy of the labor market. All
employer-employee negotiations involve trade-offs, and employees have access to mechanisms that
can moderate the potentially harsh consequences of unchecked employer-employee negotiations.
Collectively bargained agreements by a union may be sought to be invalidated by employees who feel
their union is failing to represent their interests. Actions can be brought under the ADEA since it
covers the behavior of union negotiators. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1988) (making age discrimination
by an employment agency unlawful). Collusive bargaining may violate a union's duty of fair repre-
sentation. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (Railway Labor Act required labor
union to represent all employees in craft without discrimination because of race); see also Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944) ("By its selection as bargaining representative, [the union]
has become the agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of representing their
interests fairly and impartially."); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIc TExT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZA-
TION, AND COLLECTIVE BARGANNG 699-701 (1976) (a union's violation of its duty of fair repre.
sentation may violate NLRA §§ 8(b)(1), (2), (3)). However, nonunion contracts may be under less
protection. Courts have invalidated employee benefit plans by incorporating contract principles to
employee benefit plans. See EEOC v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 618 F. Supp. 115, 122 (N.D. Ohio
1985) (suggesting that when bargaining power is unfairly one-sided, the resulting plan is not "bona
fide").
172. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
173. This definitional section effectively circumnavigates OWBPA's pension-severance integra.
tion prohibition by providing:
(C) For purposes of [the severance integration exception], severance pay shall include
that portion of supplemental unemployment compensation benefits... that -
(i) constitutes additional benefits of up to 52 weeks;
(ii) has the primary purpose and effect of continuing benefits until an individual be-
comes eligible for an immediate and unreduced pension; and
(iii) is discontinued once the employee becomes eligible for an immediate unreduced
pension.
OWBPA § 103(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(1)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1991)) (cross reference
omitted).
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lem by treating SUBs as a type of severance pay.' 74 For the purposes of
section 4(1)(2)(C), Congress deems these payments to be severance pay-
ments, not pension benefits, in order to avoid a conflict between the phi-
losophy of this section and its recognition that pension and severance
benefits are not fungible. Therefore, the provision which specifically au-
thorizes pension supplement-severance integration, new ADEA section
4()(2)(A)(ii), does not technically contradict OWBPA's general ap-
proach to severance integration.
175
In sum, OWBPA reaffirmed the validity of the cost-justification rule
in § 4(f)(2) analysis. Thereby OWBPA clarified which voluntary retire-
ment incentives are legal under the ADEA - those in which the size of
the incentive offered and the manner of its presentation indicate that an
individual has free and uncoerced choice to accept it. However,
OWBPA does not offer any guidance to individuals who feel they are
unjustly excluded from full or partial participation in otherwise valid in-
centive plans. Such individuals must rely on the morass of pre-OWBPA
case-law. OWPBA further compromised the cost-justification rule by ex-
pressly permitting a form of severance-retirement benefit integration.
Thus, by adding these provisions to the ADEA, OWBPA limits its own
impact, renders the Act a mere correction of the Betts decision, and pre-
cludes itself from being a step forward in age discrimination law.
174. Because these payments have "the primary purpose and primary effect of continuing bene-
fits until an individual becomes eligible for an immediate and unreduced pension" they are inter-
preted by Congress to be a form of severance pay. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1530.
175. OWBPA § 103(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(1)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991)). Although
social security bridge payments are not explicitly endorsed in OWBPA (see 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 623(1)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1991)), or discussed within the legislative history of OWBPA, the inte-
gration of social security bridge payments and severance pay is implied from a concurrent reading of
several OWBPA sections. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(l)(1)(BXii) and § 623(l)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp.
1991). If social security payments may be used by employers to supplement pension payments under
the new ADEA § 4(l)(1)(B) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(1)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1991)) and such
payments are activated pursuant to an employer's permanent benefit plan upon a "contingent event
unrelated to age," bridge payments would qualify for integration under the new ADEA
§ 4(1)(2)(A)(ii) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(1)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1991)). This approach is not
inconsistent with the approach taken by the EEOC in Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e) (1991).
When calculating benefit obligations under the "benefit package" approach to satisfying the cost-
justification rule, this regulation allows employers to offset health care benefits by the amount of any
Medicare for which an employee is eligible. See id For a discussion of the "benefit package" ap-
proach, see supra note 118.
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F. Further Definition of the Scope of the ADEA
1. Exemptions/Exceptions for Government Employees. Recogniz-
ing that OWBPA's amendments to the ADEA may have a severe finan-
cial impact on state governments,176 section 105(c)(1) of OWBPA gave
state governments two years to implement the new provisions, and per-
mitted state governments to continue practices which would otherwise be
prohibited by the ADEA, if state employees so elect.177 Federal employ-
ees were exempted from OWBPA out of fear that the costs of compliance
would place too great a strain on the Federal Treasury during deficit-
related fiscal crises.
1 78
176. The minority report on OWBPA accused the House Labor-Management Subcommittee of
failing "to recognize, let alone analyze" the effect OWBPA will have on the states. S. REP. No. 263,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1561. However, the various states
lobbied their plight. For example, one senator estimated that it would cost Maine between fifty and
one-hundred million dollars over a twenty year period. 136 CONG. Rac. S13,604-05 (daily ed. Sept.
24, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell). Congress was also cognizant of the ripple effect state costs
would have on the federal treasury as states asked for federal monies to help meet their expenses.
See i. at S13,248 (daily ed. SepL 17, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
177. OWBPA § 105(c) provides:
(c) STATES AND THEIR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS. -
(1)(B) ... that maintained an employee benefit plan at any time between June 23, 1989
[the date of the Betts decision] and the date... of [OWBPA] ... that would be super-
seded... by this title,... this title will not apply until... 2 years after... the enactment
of this Act.
(2)(A) ... may with regard to disability benefits provided pursuant to such a plan -
(i) following reasonable notice to all employees, implement new disability benefits
that satisfy [OWBPA] ... ; and
(ii) then offer to each employee covered.., the option to elect such new disability
benefits in lieu of existing disability benefits, if... (reasonable notice is given].
(B) Previous disability benefits. - If the employee does not elect... the new disability
benefits, the employer may continue to cover the employee under previous disability
benefits even though such previous benefits do not otherwise satisfy the requirements of
[the ADEA].
(C) Abrogation of right to receive benefits. - An election ... shall abrogate any right
the electing employee may have had to receive [pre-election] benefits ....
OWBPA §§ 105(c)(1)-(c)(2)(C) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623, Historical Note (West Supp. 1991)).
The Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury are also directed to provide States with assistance in
identifying and obtaining advice on compliance. Id at § 105(c)(3).
178. The saga of the federal employees inclusion-exclusion issue is intriguing. Neither the origi-
nal S.R. 1511 nor H.R. 3200 extended the ADEA's protections to federal employees. Critics
charged that it was inconsistent to force the states to do what the federal government could not. 136
CONG. REC. S13,287 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Pryor). A version of OWBPA that
extended it to the federal government was offered soon thereafter, subjecting the federal government
to the same two year compliance deadline as the states. Id. at S13,288 (remarks of Sen. Pryor).
Senator Pryor believed that the federal coverage issue was brought up to defeat OWBPA by making
its application too costly to ne politically palatable. The cost of federal compliance was estimated to
be between were $80 million and $114 million. See id In response, Senator Hatch offered two
amendments. The "first degree" Hatch-Kassebaum amendment would apply OWBPA to private or
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2. Definition of the Temporal Scope of the ADEA. The final mis-
sion of OWBPA was to make clear that employee benefit plans would be
subject to the ADEA regardless of when the benefit plans were cre-
ated.1 79  Section 103(2) of OWBPA adds section 4(k) to the ADEA,
which places all employee benefit plans under the purview of the Act
"regardless of the date of [the plans'] adoption."18 0 This provision reaf-
firms Congress' unequivocal rejection of the McMann decision which
had exempted plans constructed before the enactment of the ADEA, 1st
and overturns the Betts Court's resurrection of that rationale.18 2 It must
be noted, however, that other provisions of OWBPA sharply reduce the
scope of the seemingly sweeping language of ADEA section 4(k).8 3
state employees only if the federal government was in compliance with the ADEA. See id at
S13,291 (remarks of Sen. Pryor). The "second degree" amendment merely stated that the federal
government would be included within the ADEA. IdL One commentator has argued that these
amendments, when combined, may have eviscerated OWBPA by mandating federal compliance,
which would have been costly, if not impossible to achieve. See i d at S13,291-92. Senator Pryor
therefore charged that "[u]nder the guise of parity, Senator Hatch create[d] a giant loophole that
threaten[ed]to swallow up the substantive protections of this Act." Id Therefore "a vote for the
Hatch amendment [was] a vote to kill the bill." Id at S13,292 (remarks of Sen. Pryor). Because the
uncertain cost of federal compliance threatened to divide the Senate and defeat the bill, federal
employees were exempted from coverage. See id (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990), at S 13,257-58 (remarks
of Sen. Metzenbaun, who viewed this and other last minute changes as "very painful concessions").
As a result, OWBPA does not apply to the nearly three million federal employees in the United
States and abroad. See id. (remarks of Sen. Pryor).
179. S. REP. No. 433, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1510-11.
180. OWBPA § 103(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(k) (West Supp. 1991)).
181. See S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 29, repinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1534.
This Congressional rejection of McMann was intended by the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA,
which forbade mandatory retirement. The Conference report stated that "[tihe conferees specifically
disagree with the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in that case. Plan provisions in effect prior
to the date of enactment are not exempt under Section 4(f)(2) by virtue of the fact they antedate the
act or these amendments." H.R. CoNp. REP. No. 950, 95TH CONG. 2D SESS. 8 (1978).
182. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
183. Pre-OWBPA plans entered pursuant to pre.OWBPA collective bargaining agreements are
exempted, while nonunion firms must instantaneously change their plan structures. See supra note
60. Plans which apply to federal employees are not covered. See supra note 178. State disability
plans are not covered if employees so desire. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text. In
short, the temporal scope of the ADEA is irrelevant to those employers otherwise exempted, leaving
only nonunion, private employers to comply with the ADEA. The practical effect of the sweeping
guarantee ofOWBPA § 103(2), which added § 4(k) to the ADEA (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623 (West
Supp. 1991)), are completely negated for plaintiffs whose cases were pending before the Supreme
Court's decision in Betts was rendered and plaintiffs who initiated their lawsuits prior to October 16,
1990. Section 103 of OWBPA was amended on November 5, 1990 to give OWBPAprospective effect
only. OWBPA § 103, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103, 104 Stat. 978, 981 (Oct. 16, 1990) (as amended
by Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104 Stat. 2287 (Nov. 5, 1990)). For these plaintiffs, § 4(0(2) "analysis
remains controlled by Betts' definition of the subterfuge requirement and its placement of the burden
of proof on the plaintiffs." Darchuk v. Kellwood Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1579, 1580
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 18, 1991); accord Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
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CONCLUSION
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) had the po-
tential to add force to the general prohibitions of the ADEA. OWBPA,
as originally proposed, would have simply inserted the cost-justification
rule into the ADEA without qualification. Therefore, early retirement
incentives that offered greater benefit to younger workers and integrated
packages that linked benefits which had no age-related costs (such as
severance pay) to pension payments would have been rendered illegal.1,
As such, OWBPA would have been a broad stroke, overturning the
Supreme Court's decision in Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts
and brushing aside non-lump sum retirement windows and severance in-
tegration. However, examination of the numerous exceptions and quali-
fications added to the bill as originally proposed illustrates that OWBPA
emerged from Congress a much weaker law.
The most significant change caused by OWBPA is the prohibition of
pension-severance pay integration. However, even this prohibition may
be easily sidestepped through future increases in the amount of health
benefits pension plans offer in relation to actual pension payments, by the
shifting of severance benefits generally to the retirement eligible employ-
ees, or through the simple execution of a knowing and voluntary waiver
of the ADEA under Title II of OWBPA. 85 In every other area ad-
dressed by Title I of OWBPA, the Act, at best, slightly reduces the con-
191, 202 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 925 F.2d 619, 622 n.2 (3d Cir.
1991); Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 867, 874 n.18 (N.D. I11. 1991); Bell v.
Trustees of Purdue Univ., 761 F. Supp. 1360, 1361 (N.D. Ind. 1991). The fairness of a court's
decision to apply a holding retroactively turns on three factors:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of
law.... Second, [the court] must... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by
looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation .... Finally, [the court]...
must weigh the inequity imposed by retroactive application ....
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (citations omitted).
One court has dealt with the issue of the fairness of applying the Betts decision retroactively.
Despite the marked differences between the Betts Court's reading of § 4(0(2) and prior precedent
and EEOC interpretation, see infra Parts II.B, II.C. of this Comment, courts have held that Betts
may be applied retroactively because the decision was foreshadowed by the Supreme Court's earlier
decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977), discussed infra notes 96-99 and
accompanying text. See eg., Bell v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 761 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
The holding in Bell suggests that the standards established in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97
(1971), will be applied loosely in the employee benefit area. The Bell court found that Betts was fair
and proper under retroactivity analysis despite the fact that it "reshaped the law under § 4(f)(2) in
some significant respects." Bell, 761 F. Supp. at 1364.
184. See supra Parts ILE.2., IL.E.3.
185. See supra notes 61.
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fusion of pre-existing law. As Senator Jeffords stated, OWBPA is "truly
in the nature of a negotiated compromise,"1"6 and does no more than
reinstate the cost-justification rule of the pre-Betts ADEA by providing a




Plaintiffs and defendants must await future judicial or legislative
clarification of important issues, such as what constitutes a legitimate
basis on which to exclude an employee from an early retirement incentive
program. OWBPA accomplishes its stated primary goal - it overturns
the decision of Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 88 and reaf-
firms the existence, if not the strength, of the cost-justification rule in
section 4(f)(2) litigation, but it does little more.
186. 136 CoNG. REc. S13,607 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990).
187. See supra Part II.E. of this Comment.
188. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).

